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THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Peter Lee*
Abstract: This Article explores the concept of intellectual infrastructure in intellectual
property law. It makes three principal contributions. First, it builds upon prior work to
elaborate an infrastructure-based theory of productivity that encompasses trademark,
copyright, and patent law. It is well-recognized that intellectual property law promotes
productivity through allowing exclusive rights on refined intellectual creations such as
source-identifying marks, particularized expressions, and specific inventions. Somewhat less
appreciated, these bodies of law also promote productivity through ensuring wide access to
productivity-enabling “intellectual infrastructure,” such as generic words, ideas, and natural
principles, by making these assets ineligible for exclusive rights. This Article argues that this
distinction between refined “applications,” which are eligible for exclusive rights, and
foundational infrastructure, which remains subject to liberal access, is critical to promoting
commercial, creative, and inventive activity throughout intellectual property law.
Second, this Article offers a social account of the definition and evolution of intellectual
infrastructure. Infrastructure is a dynamic entity, and intellectual creations subject to
exclusive rights can “evolve into” infrastructure through widespread social appropriation. For
example, trademarks can evolve into generic words, particularized expressions can develop
into stock literary devices, and inventions can become standard platforms for technological
development. This Article argues that trademark and copyright law employ social feedback
mechanisms to relax exclusive rights on assets that become intellectual infrastructure and
further contends that the absence of such mechanisms in patent law may inhibit technological
progress. Trademark and copyright doctrines such as genericide, the idea-expression
dichotomy, and the scenes a faire doctrine dynamically relegate refined intellectual creations
to the public domain as they achieve infrastructural status. Patent law lacks an analogous
mechanism for liberalizing access to patented inventions that achieve this status, such as
isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells and information technology standards. While
patent law’s relatively short term of protection mitigates the harshness of exclusive rights on
foundational technologies, this one-size-fits-all approach ignores the reality that certain
inventions can become infrastructure well before expiration of the patent term, particularly in
rapidly advancing industries such as biotechnology and information technology.

*

Acting Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. I would like to thank Keith Aoki, Anupam
Chander, Joel Dobris, Holly Doremus, Bob Hillman, Leslie Kurtz, Bobbi Kwall, Mark Lemley,
Michael Risch, Kathy Strandburg, Madhavi Sunder, and Greg Vetter for their valuable insights on
this project. Special thanks to Brett Frischmann for his extremely thorough input. This paper
benefited substantially from presentations at the Chicago Intellectual Property Colloquium, U.C.
Davis School of Law, and the 2007 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference hosted by DePaul
University College of Law. I would also like to thank Dean Rex Perschbacher and Associate Dean
Kevin Johnson for providing tremendous institutional support for this project. I am grateful to Cindy
Dole, Nathan Jacobsen, and Ash Sahu for their research and editing assistance, as well as to the
superlative staff of the U.C. Davis School of Law library. Finally, I would like to thank the excellent
editorial staff of the Washington Law Review.

39

02_LEE_FINAL.DOC

Washington Law Review

3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM

Vol. 83:39, 2008

Third, this Article draws on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.1 to propose a social feedback mechanism for liberalizing access to
patented infrastructure. Specifically, it argues that courts in patent infringement cases should
deny injunctions and allow liability rule protection for patented inventions used as
infrastructure. Rather than simply relegating these foundational technologies to the public
domain, this approach enhances access to patented infrastructure while maintaining
incentives to invent.
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INTRODUCTION
In certain circumstances, a newly introduced technology can quickly
achieve the status of basic infrastructure that critically enables wide
arrays of subsequent innovation.2 Patents, which confer exclusive rights
for twenty years, on these foundational technologies may inhibit this
subsequent innovation, particularly in rapidly advancing fields. For
example, in biotechnology, patents on foundational resources such as
human embryonic stem cells3 and polymerase chain reaction,4 a basic
laboratory technique for copying DNA, have raised concerns that such
“upstream” patents may inhibit “downstream” research and

2. See infra Part I.A for an extended definition of infrastructure.
3. See Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for
Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 158
(2002); Emily Singer, Stem Cells Stuck in Patent Quagmire, TECH. REV. (Apr. 24, 2006), available
at http://www.technologyreview.com/biztech/16728 [hereinafter Singer, Stem Cells Stuck]; Jeanne
F. Loring & Cathryn Campbell, Intellectual Property and Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
311 SCIENCE 1716, 1716 (2006).
4. See Cetus To Exact Royalties from PCR Sales; Probe Absolves Convicted Rapist, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 5, 1988, at 7.
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development.5 In the information technology realm, patents on
interoperability standards, such as the JPEG protocol for photographic
compression6 and the design of key memory chips,7 have sparked similar
concerns from software and hardware developers who build their own
innovations based on this infrastructure. The problem of exclusive rights
on upstream, infrastructural resources has informed recent Supreme
Court pronouncements,8 congressional patent reform proposals,9 and
academic commentary,10 all of which suggest that the patent system may
sometimes subvert, rather than advance, its constitutional objective to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”11
The evolution of a novel, singular innovation into broadly used
infrastructure is a phenomenon endemic to many creative fields.
Language is highly dynamic, with fabricated neologisms such as
“yuppie” and “e-mail” quickly becoming indispensable means of general
communication. In the musical realm, the twelve-bar blues form was
once a novel innovation, but ultimately became the standard platform for
almost every blues, rock and roll, and country song.12 In the scientific
5. Of course, some argue that upstream patents promote downstream productivity because these
patents provide incentives to create the foundational technologies that enable subsequent
innovation. Compare Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (observing that upstream
patents may inhibit scientific research) with id. at 538–39 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that upstream patents encourage creating foundational technologies that
enable downstream research).
6. See Michael Kannellos, Forgent Settles JPEG Patent Cases, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 1, 2006,
http://www.news.com/Forgent-settles-JPEG-patent-cases/2100-1014_3-6131574.html?tag=item.
7. See In re Rambus Inc., No. 9302, Opinion of the Commission (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006); Pamela
A. MacLean, ‘Rambus’ Ruling is a Standards Landmark, THE NAT’L L. J. (Oct. 23, 2006); Mark A.
Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property Rules or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 783, 837−38 (2007).
8. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922
(2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (“[S]ometimes too much
patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . . .”).
9. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R.
2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
10. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]; Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of
Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain
Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 81 (2005) [hereinafter Lee,
Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery]; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–701
(1998); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37−38 (1991).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special
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realm, Thomas Kuhn has famously theorized that revolutionary
scientific theories spark “paradigm shifts” that upset accepted
worldviews—only to become dominant worldviews themselves that
define the direction of “normal science.”13 In all of these contexts,
exclusive rights on the germinal resource—a word, musical form, or
scientific theory—can inhibit widespread appropriation of that asset and
significantly burden downstream productivity.
This Article explores this phenomenon throughout intellectual
property law, focusing particularly on patent law. In so doing, it
examines how trademark and copyright law deal with innovations that
evolve into widely needed infrastructure. Intellectual property law is
premised on the idea that granting exclusive rights to specific creations,
such as particular brand names, expressions, or technical designs, will
promote progress.14 However, these specific creations can quickly
evolve into general infrastructure, such as when a trademark becomes a
generic word, an expression develops into a stock literary device, or an
invention emerges as a standard platform for technological development.
As we will see, trademark and copyright law possess socially attentive
mechanisms to relax protection on assets that evolve into widely needed
infrastructure; patent law, as conventionally conceived, lacks this
capability. This Article proposes such a mechanism that is specifically
tailored to patent law.
This Article makes three principal contributions. First, it extends
previous work to elaborate an infrastructure-based theory of productivity
that spans trademark, copyright, and patent law. In so doing, it argues
that infrastructure plays a critical role in delineating the appropriate
boundary between protectable and nonprotectable subject matter
throughout intellectual property law. In trademark, copyright, and patent

Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 766−67 (2007).
13. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–22 (3d ed. 1996).
14. Of course, “progress” is a highly contested concept. This Article focuses on the objective of
promoting economic, creative, and inventive productivity that has long been central to intellectual
property law. By focusing on progress as productivity, this inquiry avoids intractable problems such
as evaluating whether contemporary artistic works represent aesthetic “progress” over classic
works. This originalist, economic paradigm, however, leaves important issues of distributive justice
and cultural recognition unresolved. See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property and Social
Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559 (2006). While this Article does not directly address these
concerns, it integrates cultural considerations with economic theory to show that even within the
originalist paradigm, intellectual property must accommodate social and cultural evolution to
effectively promote productivity. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 264 (2006)
[hereinafter Sunder, IP3].
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law, raw materials such as generic words, abstract ideas, and natural
principles constitute “intellectual infrastructure” that is not eligible for
individual ownership.15 Open access to these foundational assets
facilitates their broad exploitation by the public at large, thus promoting
productivity. Conversely, trademark, copyright, and patent law only
allow exclusive rights on particularized applications derived from this
infrastructure: source-identifying marks, expressions, and inventions.
The process of drawing from “raw” infrastructure to produce refined
applications can be analogized to “cooking”—value enhancement
through human manipulation.16 While open access is the appropriate
productivity-enhancing property regime for infrastructure, exclusivity
represents the appropriate productivity-enhancing property regime for
applications: proprietary trademarks reduce search costs for consumers
and enable fair competition, and exclusive rights in the patent and
copyright contexts provide incentives to create. Applying opposite
property regimes to infrastructure and application thus helps trademark,
copyright, and patent law achieve their utilitarian ends. Accordingly, all
three disciplines have developed doctrines to distinguish these two
classes of intellectual assets.
Second, this Article provides a social account of the evolution of
intellectual infrastructure, and it reveals how trademark and copyright
law dynamically accommodate this evolution while patent law does not.
Through a different process of value enhancement—widespread social
adoption and reliance—certain applications can become so indispensable
to a broad range of downstream uses that they become infrastructure. For
example, trademarked terms can enter the vernacular as generic words
such as “aspirin” or “thermos.” Particularized expressions can become
stock literary elements, such as the Swiss bank account that has become
a standard plot device in international espionage stories. Inventions can

15. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 928 (2005) (describing several examples of intellectual infrastructure in
copyright and patent law) [hereinafter Frischmann, Economic Theory].
16. I use the terms “raw” and “cooked” differently than Claude Levi-Strauss, for whom they
generally signify “natural” and “cultural” elements, respectively. See generally CLAUDE LEVISTRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., Harper &
Row 1969); see also Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: A
Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1613, 1618 (2005). For my purposes, generally speaking, “raw” assets represent
infrastructural building blocks for which enhanced access is appropriate while “cooked” assets are
refined, particularized, and properly subject to exclusive rights. However, as I explore at length, this
paradigm is complicated when a “cooked” asset achieve the status of infrastructure.
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quickly become standard platforms for technological development, such
as the technique for gene splicing, a fundamental innovation around
which a significant portion of the biotechnology industry has coalesced.
Through widespread adoption and reliance, applications can evolve into
infrastructure. This in turn complicates the familiar productivity model
wherein intellectual property law grants exclusive rights to applications
while ensuring wide access to infrastructure.
As this Article demonstrates, trademark and copyright law use socialfeedback mechanisms to relax exclusive rights on applications that have
become infrastructure; patent law lacks such a mechanism, thus
potentially inhibiting technological development. In trademark and
copyright law, doctrines such as genericide, the idea-expression
dichotomy, and the scenes a faire doctrine17 allow courts to consider
social practice and norms in eliminating exclusive rights on applications
that society has come to regard as infrastructural. Trademarks that
become generic words lose their trademark status. Similarly, expressions
that become stock literary devices are no longer eligible for copyright
protection. “Retiring” exclusive rights on these infrastructural resources
facilitates their unfettered use by the community at large. Patent law has
no analogous, dynamic mechanism for liberalizing access to patented
inventions that have achieved the status of infrastructure. Instead, it
relies on a relatively short term of protection (twenty years) to provide
“timely” access to foundational technologies. However, in fast-moving
industries, patented inventions can become infrastructure well before the
patent expires. Patent law’s rigidity is not only out of step with its
intellectual property siblings, but it is also inconsistent with myriad real
property doctrines that enhance access to proprietary infrastructure in
response to evolving social needs.
Third, having identified this deficiency in patent law, this Article
offers a solution. Specifically, it draws from the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.18 to propose a case17. In brief, the doctrine of genericity prohibits trademarks on generic words that signify entire
product classes, such as “car” or “computer.” See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). The idea-expression dichotomy allows copyrights on
particularized expressions, such as the text of a book and close paraphrasings, but not on general
ideas, such as “boy meets girl.” See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930). The scenes a faire doctrine prohibits copyright protection on standard, stock, or
necessary expressions, such as the hackneyed Swiss bank account of the international spy genre.
See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). (This Article adopts the
Anglicized version of “scenes a faire,” which courts also refer to as “scènes à faire.”)
18. 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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specific social feedback mechanism for liberalizing access to patented
infrastructure. eBay replaces the Federal Circuit’s per se rule under
which courts virtually automatically granted motions for injunctive relief
upon a finding of patent infringement.19 Instead, courts must now apply
the traditional, multi-factor equitable framework long used in non-patent
cases to determine the appropriateness of injunctions.20
This Article argues that courts should consider the infrastructural use
of a patented invention when determining infringement remedies and, in
certain circumstances, allow such use to continue by a downstream user
contingent upon providing compensation to the patentee. This Article
proposes a two-tiered system in which courts would continue to protect
ordinary inventions not serving as infrastructure with a property rule (via
injunctive relief) but would have the flexibility to protect patented
inventions serving as infrastructure with a liability rule21 (via royalties).
Inventions that would be eligible for liability rule treatment would
satisfy three criteria: (1) they would constitute infrastructure, a concept I
discuss at length in Part I.A; (2) the alleged infringer would be using the
invention in an infrastructural manner; and (3) the invention would not
be reasonably available through ordinary licensing. To be effective,
liability rule protection would extend both to inventions that have clearly
achieved infrastructural status, such as widely used, patented
information technology standards, as well as to inventions whose limited
availability demonstrates significant potential for infrastructural use,
such as patented human embryonic stem cells. Although this proposal
allows courts to determine an ongoing royalty for continued
infringement of infrastructural inventions, a court-determined royalty
would only represent a last resort if parties could not voluntarily
negotiate a license.
This proposal offers several significant advantages. First, it enhances
patent law’s responsiveness to productivity dynamics in particular
technological fields by relaxing exclusive rights on inventions as they
become critical platforms for downstream development. This proposal
mitigates the possibility that exclusive rights on infrastructural
19. Id. at 1839 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
20. Id.
21. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). While Calabresi
and Melamed primarily discuss liability rules in the context of awarding one-time damages, I extend
their framework to also include awarding ongoing royalties.
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inventions will serve as a bottleneck that inhibits downstream
productivity. Analyzing infrastructural status at the time of infringement,
rather than upon patent issuance, allows courts to consider an
invention’s social history and specific exploitation on a case-by-case
basis when determining the appropriateness of enjoining infringement.
Second, this proposal moves beyond the trademark and copyright
contexts where a binary choice between open access and exclusive rights
is adequate. Through applying liability rules, this Article offers a
nuanced guide to use-specific, compensation-dependent access to
patented infrastructural technologies. This approach enhances access to
proprietary infrastructure while still maintaining incentives to invent.
Third, while liability rules may serve as a useful judicial backstop to
enhance access to patented infrastructure, this proposal maintains
numerous opportunities for parties to voluntarily negotiate licenses.
Furthermore, by changing the baseline conditions of these negotiations,
this proposal may help reduce the transaction costs that often undermine
private ordering.
In addition to offering a concrete proposal for patent law, this inquiry
holds implications that extend far beyond that single field. First, it
highlights the methodological value of intradisciplinary comparison
within intellectual property law in general.22 Although analogies are
rarely perfect, and although trademark, copyright, and patent law exhibit
significant theoretical and doctrinal differences, these fields can still
borrow fruitfully from each other when solving certain shared problems.
Second, this intradisciplinary comparison reveals a natural limitation on
intellectual property rights, which are structured to maintain access to
infrastructure and prevent pernicious intellectual monopolies.23 Finally,
22. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 205 (2003) (noting similarities between patent law’s exclusion of
scientific and mathematical principles and copyright’s exclusion of ideas); Mark Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (suggesting a
copyright analog for “blocking patents”) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement]; Oskar
Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 177 (2007) (applying the originality requirement to constrain gene patents); Oskar Liivak,
The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2005) (applying the originality requirement, commonly associated
with copyrights, to patent law); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing an analog of copyright’s fair use doctrine for
patent law); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119
(1991) (proposing reforms to the idea-expression dichotomy based on analogous concepts in patent
law).
23. This infrastructural insight bolsters criticisms of the ever-expanding nature of intellectual
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this Article begins to reconcile progressive calls to enhance intellectual
property law’s attentiveness to social context with this legal field’s
traditional economic objective of promoting productivity.24 This Article
shows that intellectual property law can only achieve its originalist goal
of promoting productivity if it is sensitive to the evolving infrastructural
needs of creative communities.25
Part I argues that differential treatment of intellectual infrastructure
and application is essential to promoting productivity in trademark,
copyright, and patent law. Extending previous work,26 Part I provides a
comprehensive account of intellectual property doctrines that distinguish
nonprotectable infrastructure from protectable application: trademark’s
doctrine of genericity; copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy and
scenes a faire doctrine; and patent law’s prohibition against patenting
natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.27
Part II turns to real property to show both that infrastructure evolves
and that legal doctrines respond to this evolution by liberalizing access
to assets that become infrastructure. Society’s widespread use and
reliance on productivity-enabling resources can transform them into
infrastructure. Analogously, trademarked terms, particularized
expressions, and specific inventions can “evolve” into infrastructure
through society’s widespread use and reliance upon them as basic
building blocks of communication and creation. Drawing from Professor
Carol Rose’s concept of “inherently public property,” Part II shows how
property rights. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37−40 (2003).
24. See Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 264 (urging scholars to integrate economic and cultural
accounts of intellectual property).
25. This analysis draws much from the “social relations” view of property rights associated with
Joseph Singer. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
663 (1988) [hereinafter Singer, The Reliance Interest]. Ultimately, this Article suggests a more
productive way for patents to mediate the relationship between upstream inventors and downstream
users and society at large.
26. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
27. See supra note 17. The prohibition against patenting natural laws, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas excludes these entities from patentable subject matter, reserving exclusive rights only
for particularized inventions. Related, though not identical, concerns over distinguishing
nonprotectable infrastructure from protectable application also apply to the right of publicity. See
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512−23 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that an expansive right of publicity can inhibit
subsequent creative expression). I here focus on the “core” intellectual property disciplines of
trademark, copyright, and patent law. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 885 (2007).
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certain real property doctrines, such as eminent domain, public
prescription, the public trust doctrine, and custom, relax exclusive rights
on resources that are widely needed to promote productivity.28 Applied
to intellectual property, these doctrines provide a model for liberalizing
access to trademarks, expressions, and inventions that evolve into
intellectual infrastructure.
Part III then examines the extent to which various intellectual
property doctrines accommodate the evolution of intellectual
infrastructure. A striking continuum emerges. Trademark’s doctrine of
genericity is highly attentive to evolving social meanings in determining
when a trademarked term has become generic, thus warranting its
preservation in the public domain as intellectual infrastructure.
Copyright law occupies an intermediate position by ensuring access to
expressive elements that society has come to recognize as “stock” or
“standard” as nonprotectable infrastructure. At the far end of the
continuum, patent law has no such social feedback mechanism. It is
insensitive to demand-side29 considerations favoring broad access to
patented inventions, such as isolated, purified human embryonic stem
cells and information technology standards, that fundamentally enable
downstream research and development. Part III acknowledges patent
law’s differences from trademark and copyright law, but concludes that
these differences do not fully justify patent law’s rigid approach. Among
other considerations, it explains how patent law’s relatively short term of
protection does not provide adequate access to foundational technologies
that became infrastructure within a short time after patenting.
Part IV presents a remedy. Moving beyond the all-or-nothing choice
between open access and strict exclusive rights, Part IV proposes a
workable model for use-specific, compensation-dependent access to
patented infrastructure. This solution arises organically from the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
which provides courts greater latitude to deny injunctions in patent
infringement suits and to protect patents with a liability rule.30 I advocate
28. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 714, 720 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons].
29. In economic terms, demand-side considerations relate to the interests of consumers while
supply-side considerations relate to the interests of producers. For patented infrastructure, such as
isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells, demand-side considerations favor free access to
these cells to facilitate their downstream exploitation by users. However, such open access would
undermine producers’ supply-side incentives to invest in developing such cells in the first place.
30. 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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a two-tiered system in which inventions used in a non-infrastructural
capacity would continue to receive property rule protection, but
infrastructural use of a patented technology would weigh in favor of
denying an injunction and protecting the patent with a liability rule. In
the context of a particular infringement suit, courts would extend
liability rule protection to a patented invention that: (1) comprises
productivity-enhancing infrastructure, (2) was actually used by an
alleged infringer in an infrastructural capacity, and (3) was not
reasonably available through ordinary licensing. This approach would
enhance access to patented infrastructure while still maintaining
incentives to invent.
I.

PROMOTING PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH LIBERAL
ACCESS TO INTELLECTUAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Trademark, copyright, and patent law all promote productivity by
applying opposing property regimes to intellectual infrastructure and
application. This Article uses analogy to identify shared principles
among these three fields,31 a method that courts and commentators have
found fruitful.32 While one must acknowledge significant differences
among these disciplines,33 these differences should not obscure
significant conceptual and doctrinal similarities. Subject matter is the
31. See Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 152
(2003) (comparing minorities in the shareholder and constitutional contexts and noting that “[s]uch
intradisciplinarity seems especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on analogical
reasoning”).
32. See supra, note 22; eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (harmonizing patent law with
traditional injunction practice applying to copyright law); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922–23 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (noting the similarity of patent law’s exclusion of scientific principles and
copyright’s exclusion of ideas from protectable subject matter); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
201 (2003) (“Because the [constitutional] Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also
authorizes patents, congressional practice with respect to patents informs our inquiry.”); Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (noting the “historic kinship” of copyright
and patent law); United States ex rel. The Baldwin Co. v. Robertson, 265 U.S. 168, 180 (1924)
(recognizing that Congress intended early trademark legislation to afford applicants the same
equitable remedies available to patent applicants); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth,
Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[J]ust as copyright law does not protect ideas . . . neither does
trade dress law protect an idea, a concept, or a generalized type of appearance.”).
33. Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (noting that patent law extends further than
copyright law in allowing exclusive rights on technical ideas); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322
(1871) (observing that trademarks, unlike copyrighted or patented works, need not be original to the
creator). My arguments are based on functional analogies among these doctrines, not analytical
identity.
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most obvious point of convergence: intellectual property deals with
exclusive rights in intangible assets. Broadly speaking, promoting
progress through enhancing productivity is another commonality.34
Accordingly, this Part first situates intellectual infrastructure in the
shared utilitarian objectives of trademark, copyright, and patent law. It
then presents an economic definition of infrastructure that helps explain
why open access to this type of resource is critical to promoting
productivity. Finally, this Part explores various doctrines that distinguish
intellectual infrastructure from application: trademark’s genericity
doctrine; copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire
doctrine; and patent law’s prohibition against patenting natural laws,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.
A.

The Utilitarian Foundations of Intellectual Infrastructure

At a general level, trademark, copyright, and patent law all aim to
promote some type of progress, whether commercial, creative, or
technological. As we will see, while granting exclusive rights on some
kinds of intangible assets can promote progress, exclusive rights on
other kinds can actually inhibit it. Of course, “progress” is a highly
contested concept.35 In my analysis, I focus on traditional interpretations
of progress in the intellectual property context that relate economic,
creative, and inventive productivity to aggregate social welfare.
Although this economic focus on ensuring marketplace efficiency and
producing cultural and technological goods does not directly address
questions such as whether some goods are aesthetically “better” than
others,36 or whether they are equitably distributed,37 it holds great
currency in intellectual property doctrine. As others have argued,
economic, cultural, and other theories all have roles to play in explaining
34. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 10, at 1031 (“Intellectual property protection in the United
States has always been about generating incentives to create.”).
35. See Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 284 (“The utilitarian approach to intellectual property does
not ask: Who makes the goods? Who profits, and at whose expense?”); Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2004)
(emphasizing distributional concerns in intellectual property law); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1162−70 (2007) [hereinafter Cohen,
Creativity and Culture]; Brett Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and the Wealth of Networks,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (2007) (noting multiple conceptions of “progress,” one of which
involves promoting widespread participation in creative activities).
36. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (cautioning
against judicial evaluations of artistic merit in copyright cases).
37. See Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 284.
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and critiquing intellectual property.38 Indeed, as I hope to show,
attentiveness to the evolving needs of creative communities is essential
for intellectual property to achieve is traditional economic objectives.
Trademark, copyright, and patent law all exhibit a strongly utilitarian
character. Trademarks confer exclusive rights to “marks,” such as brand
names, logos, and even distinctive product designs, which firms can use
to identify their particular goods and services in the marketplace.
Although trademarks, unlike copyrights and patents, do not provide
direct incentives to create,39 they ultimately aim to promote
productivity.40 In enacting the Lanham Act,41 the framework for federal
trademark law, Congress intended to foster competition and enhance
general consumer welfare.42 Trademarks reduce search costs for
consumers,43 prevent public deception,44 and mitigate free-riding by
imitators.45 While protecting reputable firms suggests a moral desert
basis for trademark law, this theory falters given that despite a trademark
owner’s well-established reputation and substantial marketing efforts,
any trademark that becomes generic is subject to cancellation.46 While
traditional notions of commercial morality and unfair competition
inform trademark doctrine, its modern formulation features a strong
utilitarian emphasis on streamlining market transactions.
The utilitarian character of copyright and patent law arises most
clearly from their constitutional objective “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”47 While copyright offers some protection for
38. Id. at 264; see Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note 35, at 1155−62.
39. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Lanham Act].
40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 166.
41. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
42. S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3−5 (1946); see Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
189, 198 (1985); Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948) (describing how trademarks serve both private and public
interests).
43. Lemley, Lanham Act, supra note 39, at 1690.
44. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871); see Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879);
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767−78 (1992) (noting that the Lanham Act
seeks to prevent deceptive marks and protect firms against unfair competition). But see Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841
(2007) (emphasizing that early trademark law sought to protect producers, not consumers).
45. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002).
46. See infra Part I.B.1.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. By comparison, federal trademark law relies on the Commerce
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authors’ “moral rights,”48 its doctrinal basis has traditionally been
understood as utilitarian.49 Although the “immediate effect” of copyright
law “is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor,” the
“ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.”50
Patent law is similarly instrumental, with the constitutional objective
of promoting technological progress51 acting as a limiting condition on
Congress’s power over the patent system.52 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the “ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new
designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”53

Clause for constitutional authorization. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
48. Moral rights, which hold great currency in Continental copyright law, protect copyrighted
works as extensions of an author’s persona and do not arise from an explicitly utilitarian aim to
encourage production of such works. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957 (1982) (arguing that ownership of property is essential to realizing one’s individual
potential, and laying the foundation for justifying copyright as protecting the integrity of the
author’s persona); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 383–88 (1993) (discussing moral
rights); see Douglas Y’Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by Copyright,
49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 659−60 (1998) (describing the incentives and personhood paradigms for
copyright). United States copyright law does offer limited protection of moral rights for certain
kinds of visual art. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (codifying the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and
Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5, 26 (2001).
49. But see Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 286−88 (noting that moral rather than efficiency
concerns animated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)).
50. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see H.R. REP. NO. 602222, at 7 (1909); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (characterizing Congress’s
“constitutional command” as creating “a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science’”); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (rejecting the so-called “sweat of the
brow” theory of copyright); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of the authors.”); see also Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 79, 83 (1989) (“The function of copyright is to promote creativity and the dissemination of
creative works, so that the public may benefit from the labor of authors.”) [hereinafter Kurtz, The
Scenes a Faire Doctrine].
51. Some scholars debate the original meaning of “progress” in the Constitution. See, e.g., Malla
Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV.
754, 755 (2001) (arguing that progress in this context means “diffusion”).
52. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
53. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). But see Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131−38 (2006) (arguing that the
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While acknowledging the valuable contributions of inventors,54 the
Court has accordingly rejected any moral rights or Lockean labor theory
justifications for granting patents.55
While exclusive rights on intangible assets can advance productivity,
they can also inhibit it. In trademark, exclusive rights on brand names
and logos lower transactions costs and enhance competition. In
copyright and patent law, exclusive rights establish incentives to create
expressive works and inventions. This model equates property rights
with productivity.56 However, ownership is not a natural right but is
contingent on promoting productivity.57 As such, all three disciplines
must address a shared question: what happens when conferring exclusive
rights actually inhibits progress?58 After all, trademarks on generic
words might hamper commerce, and copyrights and patents on ideas and
natural principles might inhibit downstream productivity.
Accordingly, all three disciplines possess functional doctrines to limit
exclusive rights to facilitate subsequent productivity. Specifically, all
three disciplines distinguish nonprotectable intellectual infrastructure
from protectable intellectual application.59 Infrastructure includes
generic words, creative ideas, stock literary devices, natural laws,
physical phenomena, and abstract technical ideas. These basic building
blocks of communication, expression, and invention reside in the public
domain for all to use.60 Infrastructure enables productivity, and its wide
disclosure requirement is inconsistent with prevailing theories justifying the patent system).
54. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“An
inventor . . . gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human
knowledge.”).
55. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330−31 (1945) (“The
primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts
and sciences.”); id. at 331 n.1 (noting that the purpose of patents is “much deeper and the effect
much wider than individual gain”) (quoting TNEC Hearings, Part 3, p. 857).
56. See Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note 35, at 1170 (“A legal regime meant to
promote progress requires a set of premises about the ways in which progress develops.”). See
generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967)
(arguing that property rights help internalize externalities and thus encourage efficient resource
exploitation).
57. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
58. Most commentators have focused on this shared concern between copyright and patent. See,
e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1180. However, productivity concerns also inform trademark’s
doctrine of genericity. See Part I.B.1.
59. I make no claim to coining “intellectual infrastructure.” See Frischmann, Economic Theory,
supra note 15, at 990−1003.
60. These assets occupy one region of the public domain, alongside creative works and inventions
for which the protected terms have expired, assets dedicated to the public, and other resources
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availability in the public domain allows for its broadest possible
exploitation. Individuals work from these “raw” materials to produce
“cooked” creations eligible for exclusive rights: source-identifying
marks, particularized texts, and specific inventions.
In elaborating the concept of intellectual infrastructure, I extend the
work of Professors Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley.61 Professor
Frischmann presents a demand-side economic model that defines an
infrastructural resource as satisfying three criteria: (1) the resource is at
least partially nonrival; (2) it derives its primary social value from
facilitating downstream productive activity; and (3) it serves as an input
into a wide range of goods and services, including private, public, and
nonmarket goods.62 Extended to intellectual property, intangible
resources satisfying these criteria qualify as intellectual infrastructure.63
These resources facilitate broad arrays of downstream activity, thus
creating a powerful demand-side argument for making them widely
available in the public domain.64
The first criterion, nonrivalry, indicates that within certain limits,
additional consumption of infrastructure does not diminish its
availability for others to use. For example, subject to constraints of
congestion, additional users in a telephone network do not diminish that
network’s overall capacity to facilitate communication.65 Intangible
assets such as words, ideas, and natural principles exhibit perfect
nonrivalry because additional “consumption” of these resources does not
diminish their availability at all,66 thus well-suiting them for open
access.

ineligible for exclusive rights. See Pamela Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain,
in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 7−25
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). These other assets also function as
infrastructural elements. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 291. However, I focus here
on “pure” intellectual infrastructure that is never eligible for individual ownership, such as generic
words, abstract ideas, and natural principles.
61. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26.
62. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956.
63. See id. at 990−1003.
64. See id. at 922−23; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 282 (“Frischmann’s organizing
heuristic is ‘if infrastructure, then commons.’”).
65. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 953−55.
66. See VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180−81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1871)
(describing ideas as “expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point”).
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The second criterion emphasizes that infrastructure is “intermediate”:
its primary social value resides in enabling downstream productivity.67
The value of words, ideas, and natural principles in the utilitarian
context of the intellectual property system derives largely from their role
as means—enablers of commercial transactions, creative expressions,
and tangible inventions—rather than as ends in and of themselves.68
The third criterion reflects infrastructure’s ability to enable a wide
array of downstream activities.69 While many resources, from beakers to
mechanical pencils, are inputs into downstream production chains,
infrastructure is different. Intellectual infrastructure, such as words,
ideas, and natural principles, contributes to an extremely wide range of
downstream applications, as well as to many kinds of applications,
including private, public, and nonmarket goods.70
As Frischmann and Lemley recognize, several intellectual property
doctrines operate to keep intellectual infrastructure in the public domain.
These include subject matter exclusions such as copyright’s ideaexpression dichotomy and the nonpatentability of abstract ideas.71
Additionally, use-specific exclusions such as the fair use defense also
permit the infrastructural exploitation of certain copyrighted materials.72
I build upon Frischmann and Lemley’s work in several ways. Under
the rubric of intellectual infrastructure, I include trademark’s doctrine of
genericity,73 copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire
doctrine,74 and the prohibition against patenting natural laws, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.75 I therefore bring trademark into the
fold and extend infrastructure theory to previously unexamined doctrines

67. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 957.
68. COMM. ON MEASURING & IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, MEASURING AND IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE 5 (1995) (“Infrastructure
is a means to other ends, and the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of its contribution to these
other ends must ultimately be the measures of infrastructure performance.”).
69. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 957−58.
70. Id. Given the functional definition of infrastructure, the line separating infrastructure from
application may not always be clear. Furthermore, the same asset may constitute infrastructure in
one context and non-infrastructural application in another. See infra Part IV.D.
71. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 1003; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26,
at 284−92.
72. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 1002−03; Frischmann & Lemley, supra
note 26, at 286−90.
73. See infra Part I.B.1.
74. See infra Part I.B.2.
75. See infra Part I.B.3. See supra notes 17, 27.
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in copyright and patent law. This comprehensive analysis shows that
maintaining wide access to infrastructure is essential to advancing
productivity throughout intellectual property law. Conversely, it
highlights the significant productivity losses that can result from
exclusive rights on intellectual infrastructure.76
B.

The Doctrinal Framework for Intellectual Infrastructure

1.

Trademarks: Genericity

Through the doctrine of genericity, trademark law maintains the
intellectual infrastructure of generic words in the public domain.77 Taco
Bell cannot trademark the term “quesadilla,” which is a generic word
signifying a general class of products.78 However, it can trademark
“Crunchwrap Supreme” because this distinctive term signifies a single
product unique to that firm.
Importantly, genericity operates in a dynamic fashion over time. Ex
ante, terms that already represent the “common descriptive name” of a
product category, such as “car” or “computer,” are not eligible for
trademark protection.79 Ex post, even fabricated terms such as “aspirin”
and “cellophane,” which originated as trademarks, can lose their
protected status if they become the generic signifiers of entire classes of
products.80 Thus, a registered mark is subject to cancellation if it
becomes the generic name for the good or service for which it is
registered.81 This illustrates the phenomenon of genericide, which also

76. For a related argument for liberalizing access to infrastructure in the antitrust context, see
Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Essential Facilities, Infrastructure, and Open Access
(Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942074.
77. Trademarks are distinctive words, phrases, designs, or logos used by individuals and firms to
uniquely identify their products and services to consumers. The Lanham Act protects both
“registered” and “unregistered” marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (describing rules for registering
trademarks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (establishing so-called “federal common law protection” for
unregistered marks). Under both systems, generic terms are not protectable.
78. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
79. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100−01 (2d Cir. 1989);
Hans Zeisel, The Surveys that Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 896, 896 (1983).
80. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) (invalidating the
trademark on “cellophane” in certain contexts); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515–16
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding similarly for “aspirin”).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000). Genericity has its roots in the common law of trademarks.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995).
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applies to trampoline, yo-yo, brassiere, escalator, thermos,82 and “You
Have Mail,”83 all of which lost trademark status upon entering the
vernacular as generic words. Ultimately, keeping generic words—a
species of intellectual infrastructure—in the public domain helps
promote commercial transactions and prevents firms from leveraging
trademarks into economic monopolies.
Generic words satisfy the three criteria for infrastructure because they
are: (1) nonrival assets that are (2) valuable as inputs (3) into a wide
array of downstream uses.84 While trademarks such as “IBM” share
these attributes to a certain degree, the social value and potential uses of
a generic word such as “computer” far outstrip that of any particular
trademark, thus rendering exclusive rights on generic words inherently
problematic.85 As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[a] generic term
connotes the ‘basic nature of articles or services’ rather than the more
individualized characteristics of a particular product.”86 In a sense,
generic language is the ultimate infrastructure because it is the essential
foundation for all communication.87
Keeping generic words in the public domain serves trademark’s
utilitarian objectives in several ways. First, generic words such as
“hamburger” cannot fulfill the source-identifying function of trademarks
because they describe general product classes, not particular products.88
Thus, their use as trademarks would be unhelpful and potentially
confusing to consumers seeking particular goods and services. Second,
at a broader level, limiting exclusive rights through genericide prevents

82. John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 154, 154
(2004).
83. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818–23 (4th Cir. 2001).
84. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956−58
85. Cf. Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323,
1324 (1980) (“[C]ourts have assumed that granting or maintaining exclusive rights to generic words
would unfairly and injuriously deprive competing manufacturers, consumers, and the public of the
right to call an article by its name.”).
86. Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1974)).
87. Accordingly, scholars have recognized a First Amendment basis for preventing exclusive
rights over generic words. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity].
88. See Lemley, Lanham Act, supra note 39, at 1695 (“[T]he economic case for brands and
advertising is undone to the extent that trademarks are used in ways that affirmatively confuse
consumers.”).
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unfair competition.89 If Gatorade trademarked the generic term “sports
drink,” then POWERade and All Sport would be liable for infringement
if they sold their products using the same name.90 Consumers might
eventually believe that only Gatorade produced “sports drinks.”
Extrapolating beyond the single confused consumer, a firm could
leverage a linguistic monopoly over a generic term into an economic
monopoly, a possibility that the genericity doctrine seeks to foreclose.91
Accordingly, genericity ensures open access to a shared linguistic
infrastructure, thus permitting consumers and firms to communicate
effectively.92 Conversely, it reserves exclusive rights for terms that are
inherently distinctive or have achieved secondary meaning in the minds
of consumers and that can effectively function as market signaling
devices. In tandem, this differential treatment of infrastructure and
application helps trademark law enhance competition and prevent
consumer deception.
2.

Copyrights: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and Scenes a Faire
Doctrine

Copyright law, like trademark law, distinguishes between
nonprotectable intellectual infrastructure and protectable intellectual
application.93 However, the reason for this distinction is different:

89. Conversely, the legislative history of the Lanham Act states that “[t]rade-marks, indeed, are
the very essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing
articles. . . .” S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (1945).
90. Trademark law allows competitors to make “fair use” of a descriptive mark held by another
firm for the purpose of describing their products. Analogizing to our hypothetical example in which
trademark law allowed marks on generic terms, a similar fair use exception might allow firms to use
“sports drink” in a descriptive sense. However, Gatorade’s exclusive right to use that term in a
trademark fashion would still confer a significant competitive advantage. See Zatarain’s, Inc., 698
F.2d at 701 (describing the fair use exception for descriptive uses of marks).
91. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (holding that no one can claim “exclusive use of
a trade-mark or trade-name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods
other than those produced or made by himself”); see Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d
373, 382 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that preventing monopolies represents “[t]he ‘guiding principle’ in
distinguishing protectable from non-protectable marks”); cf. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d
141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003).
92. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 802 (1941) (“One who
wishes to communicate his thoughts to others must force the raw material of meaning into defined
and recognizable channels.”).
93. In general, copyrights confer a set of time-limited exclusive rights over original literary,
expressive, musical, and aesthetic works, including computer software, that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.
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copyright law draws this distinction not to enhance communication
between firms and consumers but to maintain creative infrastructure in
the public domain as the raw building blocks of expression. Copyright
possesses several doctrines to draw this distinction,94 all of which are
conceptually related to the idea-expression dichotomy. As elaborated in
precedent and statute,95 copyright protection extends only to the
particularized expression of a work (and minor deviations from this
expression)96 and not to a work’s general ideas. Distinguishing between
ideas and expressions promotes productivity by keeping infrastructural
raw materials freely available to all authors while maintaining incentives
to create particularized expressions.97
The idea-expression dichotomy keeps a certain type of intellectual
infrastructure—ideas—in the public domain. Applying Frischmann’s
criteria,98 ideas are: (1) nonrival, (2) valuable as means to creative
expression, and (3) inputs into a wide range of ends (consider how many
stories can arise from ideas such as “love story” and “alien invasion”).99
While the idea-expression dichotomy applies to ideas that are inherently
nonprotectable from their inception (such as “love story”), I will later
show that it also renders nonprotectable certain intellectual creations that
become “ideas” through common use.100 Ultimately, relegating these
infrastructural resources to the public domain helps facilitate creative
productivity.

94. These include the fact-expression dichotomy, functionality doctrine, scenes a faire doctrine,
and merger doctrine. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(explaining the fact-expression dichotomy); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834
F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (addressing the functionality doctrine); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing the scenes a faire doctrine); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (describing the merger doctrine).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (excluding from protection “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”). The idea-expression dichotomy applies not
only to literary ideas but also to the technical ideas embodied in functional works. See Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that copyright protection, which is easy to obtain and relatively
lengthy, is inappropriate for technical ideas, which should only be eligible for protection based on
patent law’s more rigorous examination standards). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1921 (2007).
96. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
97. See Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1993) [hereinafter Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost].
98. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956−58
99. See id. at 957−58
100. See infra Part III.B.1.
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Related to the idea-expression dichotomy is the “scenes a faire”
doctrine, which similarly maintains intellectual infrastructure in the
public domain. Relative to the idea-expression dichotomy, the scenes a
faire doctrine is even more explicitly dynamic: it relegates items to the
public domain as they become stock and standard infrastructure.101
While courts vary in precisely how they define a scene a faire102 and in
how they apply this doctrine,103 the doctrine generally excludes from
copyright protection certain “‘incidents, characters or settings which are
as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment
of a given topic.’”104 For example, in international espionage stories,
copyright protection will not attach to the inclusion of Swiss bank
accounts and femme fatales unless those elements are somehow
particularized beyond their standard treatments.105 Like ideas, scenes a
faire are also infrastructural, for they constitute the “elements of
creation, a vocabulary needed to create a work.”106 These stock elements
flow necessarily from common nonprotectable ideas107 and represent the
raw materials of expression. Accordingly, the scenes a faire doctrine
ensures that this creative vocabulary is freely available to all authors.
Differential treatment of infrastructure and application by both the
idea-expression dichotomy and the scenes a faire doctrine promotes
creative productivity. As Professor Leslie Kurtz observes, “[t]he
idea/expression dichotomy helps copyright strike a balance between
providing incentives to create and maintaining the store of raw materials
needed for new creations.”108 This concern with preventing exclusive
rights on ideas also informs the merger doctrine, which provides that
“[w]hen there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and
its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that
expression.”109 While expressions are the traditional subjects of

101. See infra Part III.B.2.
102. See Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 82.
103. Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire and Merger
Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 799–848 (2006).
104. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
105. See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986).
106. Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 114.
107. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984)
(quoting See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983)).
108. Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 83−84.
109. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988).
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copyright protection, no expression may be copyrighted if so doing
would enable one to appropriate an idea.110 Underpinning the ideaexpression dichotomy, as well as the merger doctrine, is the objective of
keeping productivity-enabling ideas in the public domain.111 In tandem,
providing incentives to create particularized expressions while
maintaining the free availability of the intellectual infrastructure needed
to create them ensures that copyright operates as “the engine of free
expression.”112
Similar productivity-enhancing concerns apply to the scenes a faire
doctrine, which dynamically relegates expressions to the public domain
as society comes to perceive them as stock or standard. Maintaining
these expressive building blocks in the public domain allows authors to
freely appropriate them when creating new stories. Moving beyond the
literary realm, courts in software cases have recognized the scenes a
faire doctrine’s productivity-enhancing character.113 In analyzing
computer programs, the Second Circuit has invoked the scenes a faire
doctrine to ensure that “non-protectable technical expression remains in
the public domain for others to use freely as building blocks in their own
work.”114
It is important to note other copyright doctrines that can liberalize
access to protected material, thus enhancing its productive downstream
exploitation.115 The fair use defense exempts qualified uses of
copyrighted material from infringement, such as for news reporting,
teaching, or parody.116 Additionally, in certain cases courts have relaxed
exclusive rights on copyrighted material by protecting it with a liability

110. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that
copyright does not inhere in the written rules of a sweepstakes contest because such expression is
inseparable from the idea of the contest itself); Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 489. For a discussion of
merger in the computer science context, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
111. While licensing could theoretically enable many downstream elaborations of a copyrighted
idea, high transaction costs, bounded rationality, and imperfect information prevent optimal
licensing. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 278.
112. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
113. Again, not all circuits have adopted identical approaches to the scenes a faire doctrine in the
context of computer works. See Murray, supra note 103.
114. Computer Assocs., Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
115. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 286–90.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994); Harper & Rowe, Publishers, 471 U.S. 539; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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rather than a property rule.117 This has occurred most prominently in the
context of derivative works, where a court will allow the author of an
unauthorized derivative work to continue to promulgate it as long as he
provides compensation to the underlying copyright owner.118 As we will
see, liability rules (including fair use, which one can liken to a zero-price
liability rule) can play a very helpful role in allowing downstream users
to access upstream protected material.119
However, liability rules as traditionally applied in the copyright
context focus on liberalizing access to particular texts that may not
necessarily be widely needed by the creative community as a whole. A
court’s decision to allow continued distribution of an unauthorized
derivative work contingent on paying an ongoing royalty may be based
more on a sense of doing justice between two disputing parties rather
than because the underlying copyrighted work is truly infrastructural. On
the contrary, the idea-expression dichotomy and the scenes a faire
doctrine are more centrally “infrastructural” in their orientation because
they liberalize access to general building blocks of creation, such as
ideas and stock expressions.
As with genericide, concerns over productivity losses from
intellectual monopolies inform the idea-expression dichotomy and the
scenes a faire doctrine. Exclusive rights over abstract ideas, which
seldom have adequate substitutes, cast a very long shadow.120 The ideaexpression dichotomy directly prohibits exclusive rights on ideas; the
merger doctrine indirectly prevents such appropriation by denying
copyright protection where idea and expression have merged. Similarly,
the scenes a faire doctrine preserves stock or standard expressions in the
117. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 (“[T]he goals of the copyright law, ‘to stimulate
the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.”)
(quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1990));
Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543–47 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), in a copyright case); New
Era Publ’ns Int’l, APS v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F. 2d 659, 663 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (rejecting the contention that once copyright
infringement is found, an injunction follows as a matter of course); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d
1465, 1478–80 (9th Cir. 1988); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair
Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513, 525–30 (1999) (proposing eliminating fair use and injunctive
relief in favor of fee-based liability rules); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130–35 (1990).
118. See Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478–80.
119. See infra Part IV.
120. See Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost, supra note 97, at 1253−58.
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public domain “because to hold otherwise would give the first author a
monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind the scenes a faire.”121 Open
access to creative infrastructure facilitates downstream productivity
while reserving exclusive rights only for literary “applications”
maintains incentives to create.122
3.

Patents: The Prohibition Against Patenting Natural Laws, Physical
Phenomena, and Abstract Ideas

As with trademark and copyright law, patent law also distinguishes
between intellectual infrastructure and application. Like the ideaexpression dichotomy, patent law prohibits exclusive rights on certain
“raw” ingredients of creation—natural laws, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas—and reserves patents only for specific inventions. As
with its intellectual property siblings, this differential treatment of
infrastructure and application helps patent law achieve its utilitarian
objectives. As I will later show, however, patent law has a static
conception of nonprotectable intellectual infrastructure and does not
accommodate the reality that certain patented inventions can become
infrastructure within their term of protection.123
Natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas may not be
patented. The Patent Act defines patentable subject matter as “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof,” but does not define that
which is not patentable.124 Subject matter exclusions thus arise from case
law125 and have been deeply influenced by the legislative history of the
1952 Patent Act, which expressed Congress’s intent that patentable
inventions “may include anything under the sun that is made by man.”126

121. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984).
122. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Only by vigorously policing the line
between idea and expression can we ensure both that artists receive due reward for their original
creations and that proper latitude is granted other artists to make use of ideas that properly belong to
us all.”).
123. See infra Part III.C.
124. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining patentable subject matter) with 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2000) (enumerating exclusions from copyrightable subject matter).
125. For a more thorough history, see Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note
10, at 92−98.
126. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
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However, as the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 127 this
expansive language does not
suggest that § 101 [of the Patent Act] has no limits or that it
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise,
Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor
could Newton have patented the law of gravity.128
This nonpatentable subject matter—natural laws, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas—comprises intellectual infrastructure.
These entities are: (1) nonrival,129 (2) valuable as enablers of subsequent
inventions, and (3) inputs into a wide range of applications.130
Accordingly, open access to this inventive infrastructure enhances
downstream productivity.
A distinction between productivity-enabling infrastructure that resides
in the public domain and refined, particularized inventions that are
eligible for exclusive rights runs throughout patentable subject matter
jurisprudence. On the infrastructure side, the Second Circuit has
famously held that “[e]poch-making ‘discoveries’ of ‘mere’ general
scientific ‘laws,’ without more, cannot be patented.”131 Additionally, in
computer sciences cases,132 courts have struck down patents claiming
algorithms as improperly attempting to claim abstract ideas.133
Distinguishing between infrastructure and application, the Supreme
Court has rejected a patent claiming a combination of various nitrogenfixing bacteria, explaining that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must
127. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
128. Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
129. Physical phenomena, such as all the members of an endangered species, are scarce and
therefore rivalrous. However, any patent claiming physical phenomena does not claim the physical
manifestations of these entities, but somewhat abstracted blueprints of them, which are nonrival.
130. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956.
131. Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944).
132. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7−13 (2001).
133. Cf. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 498, 507 (1874) (holding that
abstract ideas are not patentable); see also Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 155 (1852) (upholding a
patent on a process for manufacturing lead pipes, but refusing to construe the patent as covering the
principle of manufacturing such pipes).
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come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end.”134 While sufficient human manipulation of a natural substance may
yield a patentable invention,135 the underlying substance in its natural
state is not patentable. Analogously, while an abstract algorithm cannot
be patented,136 applying that algorithm in the context of a broader
process or machine may produce a patentable invention.137
Maintaining intellectual infrastructure in the public domain promotes
inventive activity.138 In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,139
the Supreme Court explicitly invoked the language of infrastructure
when it stated, “[t]he qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men.”140 Similarly, in Gottschalk v. Benson,141 the
Court recognized that “[p]henomena of nature . . . mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”142 These metaphors of storehouses and tools reflect
the principle of intellectual infrastructure, which is made widely
available to the public at large to facilitate downstream productivity.143
As with trademark and copyright, concerns over productivity losses
from intellectual monopolies have motivated courts in patent cases to
preserve infrastructure in the public domain.144 The Funk Bros. Court
explicitly warned against monopolizing nature’s “storehouse of

134. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (emphasis added).
135. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (upholding a patent on extracted, purified
adrenaline).
136. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 594–95 (1978).
137. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (upholding a patent on a process for curing
rubber that employs the Arrhenius equation).
138. For additional rationales behind these exclusions, see Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility:
Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519, 545−46 (2006).
139. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
140. Id. at 130.
141. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
142. Id. at 67.
143. See Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10, at 108−09.
144. Courts frequently employ the term “monopoly” in a manner different from the strict
economic meaning of the term, which involves exercising market power. In most cases, sufficient
substitutes for patented products exist to prevent a monopoly. However, because natural laws,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas lack substitutes, granting patents on such resources would
likely confer market power on the patentee, thus facilitating a monopoly.
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knowledge.”145 Brenner v. Manson,146 a case focusing on the statutory
requirement that patentable inventions must be useful147 rather than on
patentable subject matter per se, is also illustrative in this regard. There,
the Supreme Court denied a patent on a process for creating chemical
compounds of no known utility but which might be useful in subsequent
research.148 The Court explained that the “metes and bounds of that
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation . . . . Such a patent may
confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without
compensating benefit to the public.”149 Similar concerns counsel against
allowing strong exclusive rights on intellectual infrastructure.
In 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories
Inc.150 This left undisturbed a Federal Circuit decision upholding a
patent on a process for diagnosing vitamin deficiencies from elevated
levels of homocysteine in the human body.151 Many commentators had
viewed this case as a valuable opportunity to clarify the patentability of
natural principles and ideas. In his dissent from the dismissal of the writ
of certiorari, Justice Breyer noted that “sometimes too much patent
protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.’”152 This observation highlights the functional concern
driving the exclusion of natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas from patentability.153 Preserving this infrastructure in the public
domain facilitates downstream invention and ultimately advances the
utilitarian objectives of the patent system.154
145. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130.
146. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
148. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532.
149. Id. at 534.
150. 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curiam).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (citation omitted).
153. Justice Breyer’s concerns over patenting “upstream” discoveries are consistent with broader
critiques of exclusive rights in research science. See ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 275 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97
YALE L.J. 177, 180–95 (1987). But see Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the
Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 1996, at 145, 150 (noting
that informal sharing norms continue against a backdrop of formal patent rights) [hereinafter
Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons].
154. But see R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 995 (2003). Professor Wagner argues that
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Although patent and copyright law are more similar to each other than
to trademark law, these fields are all bound by a utilitarian focus on
promoting productivity. Furthermore, they achieve this end through a
shared means: preserving open access to infrastructure and extending
protection only to refined, particularized applications.155 Maintaining
infrastructure such as generic words, ideas, and natural principles in the
public domain advances commercial, creative, and inventive activity.
This doctrinal tour has revealed that infrastructure plays a functional
role in advancing intellectual property’s utilitarian aims. Infrastructure,
however, is not a static entity. More precisely, what constitutes
“infrastructure” evolves as society comes to rely on new and different
resources as critical for enabling downstream productivity. This raises
the question of whether legal doctrines designed to enhance access to
infrastructure accommodate this evolution, a question we will consider
next.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
REAL PROPERTY LAW’S RESPONSE: RECLASSIFYING
PROPERTY FROM “PRIVATE” TO “PUBLIC” TO ENHANCE
ACCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY

An examination of real property law reveals that social conceptions of
infrastructure evolve and, more importantly, that legal doctrines respond
to this evolution by relaxing exclusive rights on resources that become
infrastructure. This examination reveals several key insights for
understanding intellectual infrastructure. First, concerns over promoting
productivity lead real property doctrines to ensure wide access to certain
“information wants to be free,” and that increased copyrighting and patenting will inevitably enrich
the public domain because every creation provides “derivative” information about itself that cannot
be captured. Id. at 1002−07. Examples of this derivative information include abstract ideas,
scientific principles, and settings of creative works. Id. at 1007. Crucially, these assets largely
correlate with elements that genericity, the idea-expression dichotomy, the scenes a faire doctrine,
and exclusions from patentable subject matter are intended to preserve in the public domain.
Propertization of these assets would undermine the supposed benefit of derivative information, thus
corroborating concerns that expansive intellectual property rights are impoverishing the public
domain.
155. These doctrines share another interesting similarity: they all deal with abstraction. Judge
Hand explicitly defined ideas as more abstract than expressions. Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Similarly, generic trademarks are abstractions—they signify
an entire class of products instead of a particularized member of that class. Analogously, an
invention, if subjected to a “great number of patterns of increasing generality,” could be
conceptualized as a combination of scientific principles and mechanical forces. Id. At this level of
abstraction, exclusive rights are prohibited.
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“enabling” resources in a manner analogous to intellectual property’s
open access approach to intellectual infrastructure. Second, resources
can evolve into infrastructure based on widespread social use and
adoption. For example, the public’s continued use of an open field for
communal events can confer on that space an infrastructural quality. I
call this phenomenon the “evolution of infrastructure.”
Finally, and most importantly, real property law doctrines respond to
this evolution by relaxing (and in some cases eliminating) exclusive
rights on resources that have become infrastructure. Thus, the public’s
continual use of an open field can mature into a legally recognized right
of access that is enforceable against the landowner. Within this view,
related to the “social relations” school of property scholarship,156
property emerges not as a fixed set of entitlements, but as a dynamic
entity that accommodates evolving reliance interests.157 In this Part, I
focus on Professor Carol Rose’s work on inherently public property as
particularly helpful for understanding the social evolution of
infrastructure and how property law responds by relaxing exclusive
rights over such assets.
A. Using Real Property Doctrine to Understand Intellectual
Infrastructure
First, real property law recognizes the utilitarian value of ensuring
broad access to infrastructure. Rose’s examination of real property
corroborates the key insight from infrastructure theory that nonrival,
productivity-enabling resources are well-suited for open access.
Responding to law and economics scholarship generally favoring private
property, Rose explores the peculiar phenomenon of “inherently public
property.”158 This class of property includes resources that are generally
ineligible for exclusive rights such as roads, waterways, and even open
spaces for communal events.159 Although Rose does not frame her
inquiries into inherently public property in infrastructural terms and
although the two categories are not coextensive, they do exhibit
significant overlap. Roads, waterways, and communal gathering

156. See Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 22, at 663; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xxxix-l (4th ed. 2006).
157. Cf. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 777–81.
158. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 712−17.
159. See id.
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spaces160 are: (1) at least partially nonrival (subject to capacity and
congestion), (2) enablers of productive ends, and (3) means to a wide
variety of ends.161 Furthermore, like infrastructure, inherently public
property exhibits increasing returns to scale.162 Roads, waterways, and
fields for public dances reflect a “comedy of the commons,”163 rather
than the traditional “tragedy of the commons” associated with communal
ownership.164 For these assets, “the more the merrier”: the larger the
number of dancers in a public field, the more fun is enjoyed by all.165
Accordingly, “ownership” by the disorganized public at large is the ideal
regime for generating the significant positive externalities associated
with inherently public property.166 The same is true for certain types of
infrastructure, including intellectual infrastructure such as words, ideas,
and natural principles.167
Rose’s later study of Roman roads even more explicitly relates
inherently public property to infrastructure.168 Rose’s typology of
160. See id. at 717–18, 758−61.
161. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956–57.
162. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 768−70; see Frischmann, Economic
Theory, supra note 15, at 928. Some inherently public property, such as roads and grazing fields, are
rivalrous and thus may appear to exhibit diminishing returns to scale. However, Rose situates these
resources within the context of a broader activity—commerce—that exhibits increasing returns to
scale. Rose, supra note 28, at 768−69.
163. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 767–68.
164. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
165. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 768.
166. See id. at 721.
167. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 927–28. Cf. Landsberg v. Scrabble
Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a “strong policy
permitting all to use freely the ideas contained in a copyrighted work so long as copyrighted
expression is not appropriated”).
168. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in
the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 100–01 (2003) (describing Roman roads as
infrastructure and comparing them to the Internet) [hereinafter Rose, Romans]. See also Brett
Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 1, 30–46 (2001). Rose’s study of Roman roads also relates to contemporary
commons-based peer production, which is characterized by decentralized networks of individuals
utilizing commonly accessible resources to contribute to a value creating program. See Yochai
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 378–79, 415–
22, 436–38 (2002). Peer production, illustrated in the development of the Linux operation system,
relies on a commons and challenges the superiority of linear production models where a single
entity controls access to resources and coordinates the activities of workers. See id. at 425–26, 440–
41, 443, 445. As with Linux, intellectual infrastructure—generic words, ideas, and natural
principles—is also open source, thus enabling its most productive exploitation by the “disorganized
public” at large.
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nonexclusive property in ancient Rome includes “res publicae”:
resources open and belonging to the public by operation of law such as
roads, bridge, and rivers.169 One “especially critical factor” justifying
open access to these assets is that their broad exploitation gives rise to
“wide-ranging synergies, or what are now called network effects.”170
Similarly, generic words, ideas, and natural principles generate positive
externalities and exhibit what can be called infrastructure effects.171
As with intellectual infrastructure, individual ownership of roads,
waterways, and communal gathering spaces may enable monopolies that
hold up socially productive activity.172 The general absence of adequate
alternatives to these resources renders exclusive rights over them
particularly damaging.173 To mitigate the excesses of individual
exclusive rights, various mechanisms have developed to transform, in
whole or in part, the legal classification of these assets from private to

169. Rose, Romans, supra note 168, at 96−100.
170. Id. at 97. Network effects arise when a resource’s value increases as more people use it—
such as when a person’s purchase of a telephone enhances the value of the entire network.
171. Frischmann distinguishes between network effects and infrastructure effects. Network
effects are likely to be appropriable by owners of the network, who will be willing to pay a higher
price for network access because of them. Infrastructure effects, by comparison, involve more farranging externalities (often involving public goods) that are not fully appropriable by those using
the infrastructure. As such, infrastructure effects will not necessarily increase users’ willingness to
pay for access to infrastructure. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 972−74.
172. Rose does not address licensing, which could theoretically allow access to an infrastructural
resource while still maintaining an individual’s ownership rights. However, licensing to all
prospective users of inherently public property is generally not feasible and provides too unstable a
basis for securing public access. Preventing holdouts requires actually changing the legal
characterization of property (or at least establishing access rights to use that property).
173. In this regard, it is worthwhile to observe that both physical and intellectual infrastructure
have arisen through a complex combination of private and public initiatives. In the nineteenth
century, private companies largely financed railroads, though they received significant federal
assistance through land grants and easements. See generally C. Knick Harley, Oligopoly Agreement
and the Timing of American Railroad Construction, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 797 (1982). Also in the
nineteenth century, states constructed canals, such as the Eerie Canal in New York. The U.S. radio
broadcasting industry “represents a peculiar combination of competitive private enterprise and
government franchise.” Huseyin Leblebici et al., Institutional Change and the Transformation of
Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting Industry, 36
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 333, 334 (1991). Furthermore, the Internet has its roots in the Defense Department’s
ARPANET. Judy E. O’Neill, The Role of ARPA in the Development of ARPANET, 1961−1972, 17
IEEE HISTORY OF THE ANNALS OF COMPUTING 76, 76–81 (1995). In comparison, intellectual
infrastructure also owes its origins to both public and private sources. While individuals and firms
are the primary sources of new words (including trademarks that become generic) and literary ideas,
basic scientific research is heavily subsidized by the federal government and conducted in
significant part by scientists at public and non-profit universities and research institutions.

71

02_LEE_FINAL.DOC

Washington Law Review

3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM

Vol. 83:39, 2008

public, such as eminent domain,174 public prescription, the public trust
doctrine, and perhaps most relevant for our purposes, custom.175
Second, resources can become infrastructure based on widespread
social use and reliance. This dynamic view of infrastructure arises,
counterintuitively, from Rose’s concept of “inherently” public property.
Ex ante, the open field that Rose describes is private property;176 it only
becomes inherently public property, ex post, upon a community’s
continued reliance on it for social events. Similarly, among the infinite
number of potential paths within a stretch of land, the only one that
becomes infrastructure is the one that people actually use as a road. The
wide-ranging synergies and network effects that characterize Roman
roads as infrastructure are incidents of use. Rose’s work demonstrates
that an asset may become infrastructure through society’s widespread
use and dependence on it as an enabler of downstream productivity.
Third, and most critically, real property law responds to patterns of
social use by eliminating or relaxing exclusive rights on assets that
society has come to rely on as infrastructural. Legal classifications of
property are sensitive to evolving social practice and cultural norms.
Thus, a community’s reliance on a thoroughfare that runs through
private property may lead the government to condemn that property to
build a highway. Through the doctrine of public easements, the public’s
repeated trespass on private land can ripen into a right of use that is
permanent and hostile to the property owner.177 The responsiveness of
legal classifications of infrastructure is also apparent in the public trust
doctrine, which, among other functions, has traditionally provided open
access to communal areas such as the foreshore of beaches.178 Courts
have extended this doctrine to include the sandy beach area adjacent to
the foreshore to facilitate activities such as sunbathing that earlier
generations did not regard as important.179 Similarly, with the emergence

174. Underscoring the importance of eminent domain as a means for allowing public interests to
trump individual property rights, Contracts Clause doctrine prohibits legislatures from contracting
away their eminent domain power. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of
Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 690−91 (1988).
175. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 749−50. Although it stands on
uncertain legal ground, the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust may also fit within this paradigm.
See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 76, at 45–46.
176. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 750−51.
177. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 699−701 (6th ed. 2006).
178. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
179. Id. at 369.
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of air travel, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act of 1926,180
establishing a right of public transit over navigable airspace and
abrogating the common law ad coelum rule that a landowner’s right to
exclude extends to the heavens.181 In all of these cases, property law
relaxes individual exclusive rights to accommodate evolving
conceptions of what constitutes infrastructure.
Custom is particularly relevant to illustrating how social practice can
create legal rights to access private property that has become
infrastructure. Rose describes how the custom of holding communal
dances on a particular plot of land can transform that land into
“inherently” public property.182 Reliance interests established by the
public, which may have been arbitrary in their initial location,
nevertheless trump the seemingly legitimate interests of the landowner.
Rose notes, “[t]hus the location of customary public activities may
matter a great deal, not because it would be impossible to conduct these
activities elsewhere, but because to relocate would rupture the continuity
of the community’s experience and diminish the significance of the
activity itself.”183 Rose goes on to observe that “habit, expectation,
custom, perhaps tied to a variety of community practices, may make
property hostage to private ‘holdout’ power. The public’s custom of
dancing and carousing in a particular place, like its habit of traveling on
certain paths, makes these various lands essential.”184 Widespread social
use and reliance can imbue resources with infrastructural qualities, and
property law often responds by widening public access to those
resources.185
Property law’s responsiveness to changing notions of what constitutes
infrastructure highlights the dynamic interaction of law and norms. Early
scholarship on communal norms emphasized the role of norms and nonstate actors in resolving disputes and managing communal resources
without recourse to formal legal rules.186 However, the legal doctrines

180. See An Act To Encourage and Regulate the Use of Aircraft in Commerce, and for Other
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 69-254, §6, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), repealed by Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1401(a),
72 Stat. 731, 806 (1958).
181. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13−15
(2007); Hinman v. Pac. Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936).
182. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 758−61.
183. Id. at 759.
184. Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
185. See Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 25, at 665–77.
186. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); ELINOR OSTROM,
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mediating inherently public property reveal that cultural norms and
social practice can themselves become incorporated in legal rules. This
Article extends these real property considerations to show that resources
can “become” infrastructure in the intellectual property realm as well,
and that intellectual property law should similarly accommodate that
evolution by changing the legal status of these resources to enhance their
availability.
Infrastructure evolves, both in its social definition and legal
classification. As a community comes to rely on a productivity-enabling
resource such as a road or waterway, that resource may attain
infrastructural status. In certain cases, real property law responds to this
emerging reliance by granting public access rights to otherwise private
property.187 Similarly, intellectual infrastructure also evolves. Language
shifts as people use trademarked terms as generic words. The set of
“stock” elements necessary to tell communally recognizable stories
changes over time. And the basic suite of infrastructural assets necessary
to invent in a given field shifts as technology progresses. If infrastructure
is both socially defined and warrants legal treatment different from other
types of property, then the legal designation of infrastructure should
change along with changing social notions of what constitutes
infrastructure.188 The question remains as to how well trademark,
copyright, and patent law doctrines designed to enhance access to
intellectual infrastructure accommodate this evolution.
III. ACCOMMODATING THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
As we have seen, intellectual property law promotes productivity by
applying the opposing property regimes of open access and exclusive
rights to intellectual infrastructure and application, respectively.
Maintaining liberal access to infrastructure is critical to downstream
productivity. Infrastructure, however, is a moving target. Widespread
GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). For an overview of law-and-norms theory, see Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 77, 81−88 (1999).
187. Cf. Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 25, at 673–77.
188. There are, of course, a number of ways to accomplish this goal. I will explore doctrines in
trademark and copyright that relegate assets that become infrastructure to the public domain on a
case-by-case basis. Patent law’s relatively short term of twenty years represents another way to
ensure timely public access to infrastructure. However, for reasons I discuss in Part III.D.1, this
mechanism is inadequate.
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social appropriation and reliance can enable a particularized intellectual
creation to “evolve” into general infrastructure over which exclusive
rights may be highly problematic.
While trademark and copyright law acknowledge and accommodate
the evolution of intellectual infrastructure, patent law does not.
Trademark is highly responsive to linguistic evolution, as the doctrine of
genericide relies on changing consumer perceptions to determine when a
trademark has become a generic word. Copyright is also sensitive to
infrastructural evolution, though in a more subtle way. As once-novel
expressions develop into widely needed creative building blocks, the
idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire doctrine relegate them to
the public domain where they are freely appropriable. Patent law takes
the narrowest and most rigid approach to infrastructure. While
“primary” infrastructure consisting of natural laws, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas is not protectable, patent law has no social feedback
mechanism for relaxing exclusive rights on patented inventions that
evolve into productivity-enabling infrastructure before expiration of the
twenty-year patent term.189 This inattentiveness to social reliance
interests allows exclusive rights on widely needed technological
infrastructure to persist, thus threatening to inhibit downstream
productivity.
A.

Trademarks: Sensitivity to Changing Social Practice

Trademark law engages in a dynamic, socially responsive inquiry to
distinguish protectable marks from nonprotectable intellectual
infrastructure. Importantly, trademark law relegates marks to the public
domain whether they begin as infrastructure or whether they achieve that
status through social usage. As mentioned, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)
authorizes cancellation of a registered mark at any time it becomes
generic.190 Within this framework, the “primary significance of the
registered mark to the relevant public” at the time the mark is challenged
(rather than at the time of creation) determines whether the mark is
legally generic.191 Courts apply genericide in a factually intensive
189. See infra Part III.D.1.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000).
191. Id. This language comes from the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984. As courts have
noted, this standard adopted the test of genericness articulated in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272
F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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manner. In so doing, they draw from social data such as consumer
surveys, market information, and dictionaries to determine whether a
trademark has become an infrastructural, generic word and is thus
inappropriate for exclusive rights.192 This highly contextual inquiry also
allows courts to distinguish among the perceptions of various
communities, allowing a mark to remain a protected trademark in
situations where it has not become generic. Ultimately, this socially
attentive approach to distinguishing generic linguistic infrastructure
from protectable linguistic applications helps trademark law advance its
utilitarian goals.
The first notable feature of genericide analysis is its high sensitivity to
evolving consumer perceptions of meaning.193 In the seminal case of
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,194 the Southern District of New York
considered Bayer’s claimed trademark on the word “aspirin.”195
Focusing solely on the factual question of what buyers understood that
term to mean,196 the court concluded that for lay consumers, “aspirin”
had entered the vernacular as a generic word.197 As the commonly
recognized signifier of an entire product class, “aspirin” was susceptible
to a multitude of linguistic applications beyond Bayer’s product and
exclusive rights over such a generic term were inappropriate.
Courts rely on a wide array of social evidence to determine what the
relevant public actually understands a given trademark to mean.198 For
example, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,199 the Supreme Court
ruled that “shredded wheat” was generic, relying on evidence that
“[e]ver since 1894 the article has been known to the public as shredded
wheat.”200 Similarly, in Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Co.,201 the
192. See infra text accompanying notes 198−207
193. Courts have adopted a three-part test within which a party asserting genericide must: (1)
identify the product class for which the mark is relevant, (2) identify the relevant purchasing
community for that product, and (3) prove that the primary significance of the trademark is to
identify the class of products to which the mark relates. Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th
Cir. 1996).
194. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
195. Id. at 509.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 514.
198. Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:13 (4th ed. 2006).
199. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
200. Id. at 117.
201. 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941).
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Fourth Circuit rejected Coca-Cola’s claim to a trademark on the word
“cola,” noting widespread generic use of this term by competitors.202
More recently, the Fourth Circuit relied on historical usage, consumer
perception, and publications such as America Online for Dummies in
concluding that “You Have Mail” was generic.203 In holding that “beef
stick” and “turkey stick” were generic, one court identified competitors’
use, plaintiffs’ use, dictionary definitions, media usage, testimony of
persons in the trade, and consumer surveys as potential sources of
evidence of genericity.204
In many cases, litigants conduct market surveys to determine
consumer perceptions, as in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Industries, Inc.205 In ruling that “thermos” was generic, the Second
Circuit cited one survey indicating that only about twelve percent of the
American public knew that the word “thermos” had any trademark
significance.206 The court further noted that by the early 1950s, the
generic use of “thermos” had grown significantly in non-trade
publications and that it had become basically synonymous with “vacuum
insulated container.”207 In all of these cases, social data showed that the
public had come to understand a term as generic, thus warranting
relegation of that infrastructural resource to the public domain.
Within the genericide framework, the trademark holder’s efforts to
“police” usage of the mark are irrelevant; what matters is actual public
perception.208 Thus, in Bayer, the plaintiff’s expenditure of “large sums
of money” in marketing aspirin could not prevent the loss of trademark
status.209 In an irony at the heart of genericide, Bayer was a victim of its
own success.210 A typical firm aims to “build brand dominance to the
point of ubiquity, so that the brand is the first thing on a consumer’s
mind when considering a purchase of a particular type of good.”211
However, if the mark becomes the de facto means of signifying the class
202. Id. at 360.
203. Am. Online, Inc., v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 819−21 (4th Cir. 2001).
204. Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 789, 803 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
205. 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
206. Id. at 579−80.
207. Id. at 579.
208. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
209. Bayer Co. v. United Drug, Co., 272 F. 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
210. Id. at 512–13.
211. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2007).
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to which the product belongs, the public establishes an easement over
this infrastructural asset that the firm must accommodate.212 Public
perception that a mark is infrastructural trumps individual efforts to
maintain it as a particularized, proprietary application.
The second notable feature of genericide analysis is its highly
contextual nature. A mark may be arbitrary for one product but generic
for another because of differences in use over time, among multiple
groups, and even among various uses of the same product.213 For
example, “apple” is generic in the produce industry, but a distinctive
trademark in the computer industry.214 Accordingly, courts distinguish
among the perceptions of various consumer communities. In Bayer, the
court differentiated between chemists, physicians, and druggists, who
were aware that aspirin was Bayer’s particular product, and lay
consumers, for whom “aspirin” was generic.215 This difference in
perception led to a highly tailored remedy. The Bayer court allowed the
alleged infringer, United Drug, to use “aspirin” in its marketing to the
general public. However, the court enjoined United Drug from using
“aspirin” in direct sales to chemists, physicians, and druggists. Because
of their specialized knowledge, these consumers might be misled if
United Drug marketed its product under the same name used by
Bayer.216
Genericide is explicitly outward looking and engages the reality of
linguistic evolution. Starting from the premise that generic words are
intellectual infrastructure and inappropriate for exclusive ownership, the
doctrine relies on social data such as consumer surveys, market reports,
sales materials, brochures, and dictionaries to determine whether the
relevant consuming public understands a mark to be generic. These
social data may reveal a reality that genericide is designed to make
legally relevant: once-particularized marks, even those fabricated by
individual firms, can become the generic mechanisms by which the
public refers to entire product categories. Although the doctrine is not

212. Even registered marks that have reached “incontestable” status are subject to cancellation if
they are or become generic. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 establishes causes of actions to protect “famous” and
distinctive marks from blurring and tarnishment; such protection, of course, does not extend to
generic marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
213. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9, 11.
214. See Am. Online, Inc., v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 820 (4th Cir. 2001).
215. Bayer Co., 272 F. at 510.
216. Id. at 514.
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immune from criticism,217 genericide’s responsiveness to evolving social
norms and its ability to facilitate context-specific remedies help it
achieve the utilitarian goals of the trademark system.218 Exclusive rights
on generic words may confuse consumers and inhibit competition, and
genericide addresses this problem in a dynamic, targeted fashion by
relegating marks to the public domain as they achieve infrastructural
status.
B.

Copyrights: Enhancing Access to Stock and Standard Expression

Copyright also accommodates the evolution of intellectual
infrastructure by liberalizing access to widely used material, though in a
more subtle manner than trademark. Copyright accommodates evolving
social practice in two related ways. First, when identifying where an
element of a work falls on the continuum between idea and expression,
courts are more likely to attach the label of nonprotectable “idea” to an
element that is commonly used. Thus, society’s repeated and varied use
of what could arguably be categorized as an expression will help inch
that element towards nonprotectability as infrastructure. Second, in a
more direct fashion, the scenes a faire doctrine transmutes expressions
that are stock or standard into nonprotectable elements residing in the
public domain. Through these processes, copyright dynamically
accommodates the creative community’s need to access intellectual
infrastructure, even as the definition of what constitutes “infrastructure”
evolves.
1.

The Idea-Expression Dichotomy

The key to recognizing courts’ socially attentive application of the
idea-expression dichotomy is that “idea” and “expression” are not
qualitatively different, but represent different ends of the same
continuum.219 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,220 Judge Learned
217. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 211, at 1790–92 (arguing that genericism should focus
more narrowly on a mark’s ability to identify a source in commercial contexts, notwithstanding
noncommercial uses of the mark).
218. See Hans Zeisel, The Surveys That Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 896, 898 (1983).
219. While courts differ on the exact application of the idea-expression dichotomy, they generally
employ it to distinguish between nonprotectable and protectable elements when comparing
copyrighted and allegedly infringing works for substantial similarity. See Kurtz, Speaking to the
Ghost, supra note 97, at 1233−34.
220. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Hand offered the “leading judicial effort”221 to differentiate
nonprotectable idea from protectable expression, concluding that they
simply represent different levels of abstraction of the same subject
matter.222 In articulating his “abstractions” test, Judge Hand candidly
acknowledged that any line between idea and expression is inherently
arbitrary.223 Other courts have also recognized that the distinction
between idea and expression is “elusive”224 and “faint.”225 Not
surprisingly, scholars have criticized the arbitrary nature of the ideaexpression dichotomy, calling it “[t]he most notorious problem in
copyright law.”226
The absence of an objective framework for distinguishing a work’s
ideas and expressions leaves open the question of how, exactly, courts
make these determinations. It is here that the connection between the
idea-expression dichotomy and copyright’s accommodation of evolving
intellectual infrastructure becomes apparent. Specifically, in the absence
of a priori definitions of “idea” and “expression,” courts apply the ideaexpression dichotomy in a functional manner to best promote creative
productivity. Along the continuum between idea and expression,
application of the idea-expression dichotomy is a policy judgment,
similar to determining proximate cause in tort cases.227 Courts calibrate
221. Wiley, supra note 22, at 122.
222. In comparing a play and an allegedly infringing movie, Judge Hand stated:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only
of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended.
45 F.2d at 121.
223. Id. at 122 (“[W]hile we are as aware as any one that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem
arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it.”); see Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir.
1990) (noting that Judge Hand’s test is “not a ‘test’ at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties
that . . . does little to help resolve a given case . . . .”).
224. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587−88 (2d Cir. 1996).
225. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 2003).
226. Wiley, supra note 22, at 121; see Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost, supra note 97, at 1222;
Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 85 (characterizing the idea-expression
dichotomy as subjective and ad hoc); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective of the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J.
393, 403 (1989); see also Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The IdeaExpression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 178
(1990) (arguing that judges’ subjective estimations of artistic merit shade their application of the
idea-expression dichotomy).
227. A continuum also exists in trademark, where some terms are universally perceived as
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where an element of a creative work falls along this continuum to strike
the best balance between granting exclusive rights and preserving a
robust public domain. While vulnerable to criticisms of subjectivity, this
approach allows courts to preserve as nonprotectable certain elements
that society, through widespread use and reliance, has come to regard as
infrastructural.
In some cases, a court’s functional application of the idea-expression
dichotomy is explicit. In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian,228 the Ninth Circuit considered the alleged copying of a
jewel-encrusted bee pin.229 The court noted that the “guiding
consideration in drawing the line [between idea and expression] is the
preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected
in the patent and copyright laws.”230 Thus, the court recognized that
functional aims explicitly define idea versus expression. Herbert
Rosenthal is remarkably candid: “We think the production of jeweled
bee pins is a larger private preserve than Congress intended to be set
aside in the public market without a patent. A jeweled bee pin is
therefore an ‘idea’ that defendants were free to copy.”231 Here, the cart
clearly comes before the horse. Jewel-encrusted bee pins do not satisfy
some objective definition of “idea.” Rather, they are ideas because
treating them as such promotes creative productivity. This is a strictly
functional, rather than formal, definition of idea.232
When locating an element of a creative work on the continuum
between idea and expression, courts are more likely to construe
commonplace elements of creative works as “ideas.” While this appears
intuitive, upon further reflection it becomes clear that just because
something is common does not make it an idea. However, equating
source-identifying marks, others are universally perceived as generic, and a middle range exists
where marks may be generic in some contexts and not in others. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP.
1223, 1243–44 (2007).
228. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 742.
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. See also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir.
1986) (“[P]recisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay particular
attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and copyright law generally.
In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most
efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to
promote learning, culture, and development.”) (emphasis added).
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commonplace elements with nonprotectable “ideas” is fully consistent
with copyright’s aim of maintaining open access to widely needed
building blocks of creation.
Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc.,233 the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling of noninfringement
regarding two action figures exhibiting a similar crouching stance.234
Crucially, the court held that the plaintiff’s figures displayed an
“unprotectable idea—a superhuman muscleman crouching in what since
Neanderthal times has been a traditional fighting pose.”235 The court did
not find that the fighting crouch was a once-copyrightable expression
whose term had expired. Instead, the court found that the crouch was an
idea itself. While, analytically, one could just as easily categorize the
crouch as an expression, the fact that society has used this depiction
repeatedly in a variety of contexts contributed to the conclusion that it
was a nonprotectable “idea” that should be freely appropriable.
Other cases further illustrate this equation of “standard” or
“commonplace” elements with nonprotectable ideas. In Quaker Oats Co.
v. Mel Appel Enterprises,236 the Southern District of New York
compared two stuffed toy dogs for substantial similarity.237 In response
to the defendant’s arguments that any similarities between the two dolls
arose from nonprotectable ideas, the court noted that the plaintiff’s doll
was not “standard,” and therefore that the similarities arose from
protected expression.238 Similarly, in Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Genie
Toys, Inc.,239 the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a dog in a
train engineer’s uniform represented a nonprotectable idea.240 The court
noted that “[w]hile such a phenomenon might exist, it is hardly so
common as to require the conclusion that this combination is common or
somehow in the public domain.”241

233. 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983).
234. Id. at 361.
235. Id. at 360. The specific “expression” of the exaggerated musculature in Mattel’s dolls did
constitute copyrightable material, but this was not substantially similar to the musculature of AzrakHamway’s dolls. Id.
236. 703 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1060.
239. 491 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
240. Id. at 528–29.
241. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
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Courts’ equation of commonplace elements with ideas advances
copyright law’s utilitarian aims. Precisely because some expression has
become so widely used, it becomes a basic building block freely open to
the creative community. Adopting the awkward phrasing of the ideaexpression dichotomy, society’s continual use of an expression can
transform it into a nonprotectable idea.
2.

The Scenes a Faire Doctrine

The second, more direct mechanism by which copyright law
accommodates the evolution of intellectual infrastructure is the scenes a
faire doctrine. This doctrine recognizes that certain “stock” scenes,
characters, and plot devices necessary to express a type of story are not
subject to copyright protection.242 As with the unfortunately named ideaexpression dichotomy, the scenes a faire doctrine recognizes a
continuum that requires greater particularization and unique detail in
otherwise “stock” elements before those elements will receive
protection. In applying a higher bar for copyright protection to stock or
standard elements, the scenes a faire doctrine recognizes that certain
well-traveled expressions can become basic infrastructure that should be
generally available in the public domain.243
For example, in Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,244 the Second Circuit
compared a book and an allegedly infringing movie depicting a
struggling police precinct in the Bronx.245 The court noted that “[f]oot
chases and the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the
familiar figure of the Irish cop, are venerable and often-recurring themes
of police fiction,” and constitute nonprotectable scenes a faire absent
some differentiating detail.246 While the police fiction genre is of
relatively recent vintage, these expressions are already so standard that,
without some distinguishing features, they are not protectable.247
242. See Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50.
243. Of course, the scenes a faire doctrine does not relax exclusive rights on all types of
expression that represent cultural infrastructure. See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95
CAL. L. REV. 597 (2007) (arguing for a fair use exception for “fan fiction” that builds upon widelyknown cultural entities such as Star Trek).
244. 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 50.
247. See also Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409−10 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (finding no copyright in
elements of a play that were “old” and “well exploited” in numerous other literary works).
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Labeling these expressions as nonprotectable scenes a faire facilitates
their unfettered use by authors and helps promote creative
productivity.248
The scenes a faire doctrine preserves in the public domain elements
that are “necessary” for expression, and necessity is defined by social
practice. In Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,249 the Ninth Circuit
applied the scenes a faire doctrine to conclude that Apple’s overlapping
windows graphical user interface was not protectable.250 The court stated
that only two options existed for displaying multiple windows at the
same time: a tile system and overlapping windows. The court then
observed, “[a]s demonstrated by Microsoft’s scenes a faire video,
overlapping windows have been the clear preference in graphic
interfaces. Accordingly, protectable substantial similarity cannot be
based on the mere use of overlapping windows.”251 Although Apple’s
scheme of overlapping windows was a relatively recent innovation—as
were all graphical user interfaces at that time—the emergence of
overlapping windows as the preferred standard bolstered the court’s
conclusion that this format represented a nonprotectable scene a faire.
Although not dealing with the scenes a faire doctrine per se, another
computer software case also reflects copyright law’s aversion to
allowing exclusive rights on expressions that have become standard
infrastructure. In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,252
Borland copied the familiar menu command hierarchy from Lotus 1-2-3
in its competing spreadsheet program.253 The First Circuit held that
Lotus 1-2-3’s menu command hierarchy was a noncopyrightable method
of operation and denied Lotus’s infringement claim.254 While the court
based its holding on the statutory exclusion of methods of operation
from copyrightable subject matter, considerations of widespread
248. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The common use of such
stock . . . merely reminds us that in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely
anything new under the sun.”); see also Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that expressive elements in the Pac-Man video game such as
a graphical maze and scoring table are “standard” elements that are not subject to copyright
protection).
249. 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 815; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (excluding “methods of operation” from copyright
protection).
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consumer reliance loomed large. The court rejected as “absurd” the
possibility that users who had familiarized themselves with Lotus 1-2-3
would have to learn different methods for performing identical functions
in programs from other manufacturers.255 In his concurring opinion,
Judge Boudin was even more explicit: “A new menu may be a creative
work, but over time its importance may come to reside more in the
investment that has been made by users in learning the menu and in
building their own mini-programs—macros—in reliance upon the
menu.”256 While Lotus’s menu has some intrinsic merit, much of its
value comes from its widespread adoption as a standard that customers
have invested time and effort to learn.257 Enabling a monopoly over such
a socially constructed standard could ultimately undermine that
investment and inhibit productivity.258
3.

Sensitivity to Infrastructural Evolution in Copyright Law

While action figures and stock characters of police fiction may seem
like rather trivial subject matter, the manner in which copyright treats
them reveals an immensely valuable attentiveness to evolving social
norms. The idea-expression dichotomy and the scenes a faire doctrine
dynamically relegate elements to the public domain as they become
infrastructure. Courts apply the idea-expression dichotomy not based on
a priori definitions of these categories but on policy judgments for
balancing exclusive rights with a robust public domain. While this
approach is subject to criticism as arbitrary,259 equating commonplace
entities with nonprotectable ideas ensures that widely used infrastructure
remains in the public domain. In a related vein, the scenes a faire
doctrine “retires” commonly used expressions to the public domain as

255. Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 817−18.
256. Id. at 819−20 (Boudin, J., concurring).
257. Some have even argued for copyright law to adopt a genericity doctrine for “arbitrary”
expressions that become widely used and generic in software programs. See Lee B. Burgunder &
Carey E. Heckman, An Emerging Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 229,
247 (1987); see also Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1329, 1364−67 (1987) (proposing a scheme in which patented, industry standard operating
systems would be available to users through compulsory licenses).
258. Interestingly, the trademark doctrine of functionality would also prevent such a “standard”
graphical user interface from being the subject of exclusive rights as trade dress. See ROBERT
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
627, 714 (4th ed. 2007).
259. See supra notes 223–226 and accompanying text.
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they become stock or standard infrastructure.260 Assigning these
infrastructural units to the public domain allows for their widespread use
as building blocks for creative expression.
C.

Patents: Insensitivity to the Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure

Compared with trademark and copyright law, patent law takes the
narrowest and most rigid approach to recognizing and liberalizing access
to intellectual infrastructure. Excluding natural laws, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patentability serves the functional
purpose of keeping basic building blocks of productivity in the public
domain. However, these “raw” assets are not the only basic building
blocks of invention. Patented technologies themselves can rapidly attain
infrastructural status as inventive communities come to rely on them as
enablers of downstream invention. However, patent law has no
mechanism for liberalizing access to these refined infrastructural assets
in a timely manner.261
As with the idea-expression dichotomy, the prohibition against
patenting natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas does not
involve objectively definable categories. As Justice Frankfurter
remarked in his concurring opinion in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co.:
It only confuses the issue . . . to introduce such terms as “the
work of nature” and the “laws of nature.” For these are vague
and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and
equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed “the
work of nature,” and any patentable composite exemplifies in its
properties “the laws of nature.” Arguments drawn from such
terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to
challenge almost every patent.262
For both copyright and patent, the difference between ideas and natural
principles, on the one hand, and particularized expressions and
inventions, on the other, is one of degree rather than kind.263
260. Cf. Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note 35, at 1177 (describing creativity as “an
emergent property of social and cultural systems, continually shaped by and shaping other social
changes”).
261. For an explanation of why the twenty-year patent term is inadequate to provide timely
access to patented infrastructure, see Part III.D.1.
262. 333 U.S. 127, 134−35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
263. Compare id. at 132 (holding that an inoculum combining various bacteria does not constitute
patentable subject matter), with Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding that a
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Historically, before a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s,
courts relied on functional considerations related to advancing progress
when classifying an invention as protectable or nonprotectable subject
matter. In this sense, these early courts operated analogously to modern
copyright courts, which consider macroscopic objectives related to
promoting progress when characterizing an element of a work as an idea
or expression. In some cases, creations that may have satisfied some
formal definition of “invention” were characterized as nonpatentable
abstract ideas simply because they lacked technical ingenuity264 or an
immediate, tangible utility.265 Conversely, the extraction and purification
of a natural substance could render it patentable subject matter merely
because it became commercially and therapeutically useful.266 As we
have seen, functional interests in promoting widespread access to a
given “invention” could contribute to a court’s conclusion that it actually
comprised a nonpatentable product of nature.267 This was the case in
Funk. Bros., which sought to preserve natural elements as a “storehouse
of knowledge.”268 Without objective definitions of what constituted, say,
a natural phenomenon, courts often drew what they perceived to be the
appropriate line between nonprotectable and protectable assets to best
promote technological progress.
Courts’ ability to apply intellectual infrastructure doctrine in a
functional manner diminished sharply starting in 1980 with Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.269 In upholding a patent on a genetically engineered living
organism, the Supreme Court articulated a remarkably expansive
conception of patentable subject matter.270 Quoting the legislative
bacterium combining various plasmids does constitute patentable subject matter).
264. See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874); MERGES & DUFFY,
supra note 258, at 627.
265. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71−72 (1972) (“The mathematical formula involved here
has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means
that . . . the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be
a patent on the algorithm itself.”).
266. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
267. See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.
268. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130.
269. 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). Other developments, such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, also reflect the generally pro-patent
character of this period. See Rai, supra note 186, at 94−95.
270. A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA
491, 546 (2006) (“[I]t marked a metamorphosis in how the Supreme Court approached patent
issues—backing away from judicial restraint . . . to adopting an expansive view of the instrumental
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history of the 1952 Patent Act, the Court noted that “Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made
by man.’”271 This broad formulation of patentable subject matter has
proven very influential.272 By subtraction, it narrowly defines what I
have been referring to as nonpatentable intellectual infrastructure, which
the Chakrabarty court identified as “laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”273
A year later in Diamond v. Diehr,274 the Supreme Court further
constrained expansive interpretations of intellectual infrastructure. In
that case, the Supreme Court established that courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) should construe patentable subject matter
formalistically, without regard to the functional merits of an invention.275
In upholding the patentability of an algorithm-based process for curing
rubber, the Court emphasized that determinations of patentable subject
matter should be “wholly apart” from inquiries into other substantive
criteria of patentability, such as novelty.276 This decision encouraged a
formalistic examination of whether a claimed invention constituted
patentable subject matter, divorced from a holistic, contextual evaluation
of the invention’s potential impact on downstream productivity.277 As
such, it undermined the flexibility of courts to characterize an invention
as a natural law, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea when
productivity considerations counseled against issuing a patent.

goal of the patent system in evolving technologies.”).
271. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923,
at 6 (1952)).
272. See Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject
Matter under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REV. 217, 218−19 (2004) (“After Chakrabarty,
reference to statutory subject matter and ‘anything under the sun’ appeared frequently in
decisions.”).
273. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
274. 450 U.S. 175 (1980).
275. See id. at 188–91.
276. Id. at 191 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
277. A foil to Justice Rehnquist’s formalistic holding is Justice Stevens’s dissent, which explicitly
considers the burgeoning software industry and the role of patents in its development:
“Notwithstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the software
industry, commentators have noted that ‘this industry is growing by leaps and bounds without it.’”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael G. Gemignani, Legal Protection
for Computer Software: The View From ’79, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 269, 270
(1980)).
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The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.278 has further expanded patentable
subject matter; this development concomitantly narrows permissible
interpretations of nonpatentable intellectual infrastructure. State Street
minimizes the importance of the statutory categories of process,
machine, manufacture, and composition of matter, and instead focuses
on utility as the lynchpin of patentable subject matter.279 While
considerable tension exists between State Street and Diehr, State Street
continues a trend reflected in Chakrabarty of continually expanding
patentable subject matter.
These decisions establish a narrow, formalistic approach to defining
intellectual infrastructure. Courts may not consider the macroscopic
implications of patenting an invention when determining where it falls
along the continuum from nonpatentable intellectual infrastructure to
patentable application. While this arguably enhances the analytical rigor
of the categories comprising intellectual infrastructure (i.e., natural laws,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas), it eliminates much valuable
flexibility.
Unlike trademark and copyright law, patent law lacks a mechanism to
explicitly consider social needs and classify certain inventions as
intellectual infrastructure to prevent upstream exclusive rights from
inhibiting downstream productivity. Natural laws, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable because open access to these kinds
of intellectual infrastructure enhances productivity. However, certain
patented technologies themselves, such as gene splicing, polymerase
chain reaction, isolated and purified human embryonic stem cells, and
information technology standards, can also attain infrastructural status,
and do so well before the end of a twenty-year patent term. Similar
demand-side reasons that counsel for liberalizing access to natural laws,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas apply as well to this refined
technological infrastructure.
Existing exceptions permitting unlicensed use of patented
infrastructure are inadequate. One potential avenue for enhancing access
to patented infrastructure is the common law experimental use
exception.280 This doctrine traditionally exempted unauthorized
278. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
279. See id. at 1375.
280. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); Sawin v.
Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas.
1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279); 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
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academic, philosophical, and noncommercial uses of patented inventions
from infringement. In theory, universities and noncommercial
researchers lacking a license to some foundational patented technology
could invoke this exception to avoid liability for using that technology in
an infrastructural manner to pursue basic scientific research.281 In
particular, this doctrine was potentially helpful for allowing access to
patented research tools—technological inputs to basic scientific
research, such as gene fragments.282 However, the Federal Circuit has
severely narrowed the experimental use exception, virtually eliminating
this doctrinal “safe harbor” from infringement.283 An existing statutory
experimental use exception, which allows unlicensed use of patented
materials for tests related to new drug applications to the Food and Drug
Administration, is clearly too narrow to facilitate access to a broad array
of patented infrastructure.284
The so-called reverse doctrine of equivalents is also inadequate for
allowing unauthorized users of patented infrastructure to avoid
infringement.285 This doctrine exempts from infringement inventions
that literally fall within the claims of a prior patented invention but that
are significantly different in principle and function from the original.286
However, this doctrine eliminates liability for radical improvements to
patented inventions and is thus inapposite when downstream developers
simply use upstream patented infrastructure as it was originally
designed. The reverse doctrine of equivalents, which is invoked

FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898, at 56 (1890).

281. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement:
Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006).
282. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines research tools as “tools that scientists use in
the laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors,
combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods,
laboratory equipment and machines.” Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research
Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final
Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
283. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362−63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Katherine J.
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 81, 84.
284. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 545 U.S. 193, 205
n.7 (2005) (declining to categorically exempt from infringement liability the use of research tools
for submissions to regulatory agencies under the statutory experimental use exception).
285. See, e.g., Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 571 (1898); see Lemley,
Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1010−13; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 862−68 (1990).
286. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1010−11.
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extremely rarely, will not shield the overwhelming majority of
infrastructural uses of patented inventions from infringement liability.
As a result, the current patent framework is rigidly preoccupied with
first-order progress dynamics in which exclusive rights encourage
inventing end-user goods. This is a simple scheme in which patents
promote progress. However, this framework does not adequately
consider second-order progress dynamics in which patented technologies
themselves may become indispensable inputs to downstream production,
rendering upstream exclusive rights on those foundational technologies
problematic. Like a trademarked term that has become generic or a
particularized expression that has become a stock literary device, certain
inventions can become so widely adopted and relied upon that they
become basic infrastructure. Restricted access to these infrastructural
technologies can inhibit technological advances, thus undermining
scientific progress.287
D.

Reasons for Patent Law’s Rigid Approach to Intellectual
Infrastructure: Illegitimate Justifications and Legitimate Concerns

Unlike the dynamic approaches of trademark and copyright law,
patent law possesses no mechanism for relaxing exclusive rights on
inventions that evolve into infrastructure during the term of
protection.288 A continuum emerges wherein trademark law is highly
responsive to evolving social practice, copyright law implicitly considers
the “moving target” of what is perceived as stock and standard in
applying the idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire doctrine, and
patent law takes the narrowest and most rigid approach to identifying
and enhancing access to intellectual infrastructure. This is particularly
problematic given that relative to trademark and copyright law, patent
law exhibits arguably the most accretive model of progress, wherein
downstream advances depend on access to existing upstream
technologies.
Of course, the mere existence of differences is not necessarily cause
for concern. After all, trademark, copyright, and patent law do vary in

287. See Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114
YALE L.J. 659, 690 (2004) (arguing that early, time-limited access to foundational technologies may
be the most effective mechanism for sparking scientific paradigm shifts) [hereinafter Lee, Paradigm
Shifts]. See generally KUHN, supra note 13.
288. While there is no fixed term of protection for trademarks, a finding of genericide will
terminate protection. See supra Part I.B.1.
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their ends and means. This section explores some reasons for patent
law’s singularity. Drawing on the rapid dynamics of patent-oriented
industries, it concludes that the relatively short patent term and the
availability of voluntary licensing are insufficient to justify patent law’s
rigid insistence on maintaining exclusive rights on patented
infrastructure. Furthermore, it points out that patent law’s formalistic
rather than functional approach to identifying infrastructure is due in part
to the unique timing of this inquiry relative to analogous inquiries in
trademark and copyright. Finally, it concludes that patent law is different
from trademark and copyright law in certain respects, and that the need
to maintain incentives to invent suggests that patent law must liberalize
access to infrastructure in a manner different from that of its intellectual
property siblings.
1.

The Inadequacy of the Twenty-Year Patent Term

Patent law’s only effective mechanism for liberalizing access to
patented infrastructure is its relatively short term of protection.
Trademarks last indefinitely, as long as a mark continues to signify an
individual product or firm.289 This open-ended term of protection,
coupled with rapid linguistic evolution, renders genericide a valuable
mechanism for revisiting and cancelling marks that no longer identify
particular sources. Copyrights last a relatively long time—generally the
author’s life plus seventy years.290 The idea-expression dichotomy and
the scenes a faire doctrine operate so that elements that may have been
protectable expression at one point can become nonprotectable “ideas”
or scenes a faire upon becoming stock or standard.291 Given these long
periods of protection, trademark and copyright law utilize dynamic
doctrines to free up assets as they achieve infrastructural status.

289. See Lanham Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2000) (allowing successive ten-year periods of
registration). For example, Coca-Cola first registered its trademark as early as 1893. See Coca-Cola
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
290. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301−304 (2006)) (extending copyright protection
an additional twenty years to the author’s life plus seventy years); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of term extension). Currently, the term of
protection of anonymous, pseudonymous, and institutional authors is the lesser of ninety-five years
from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
291. Such examples are most likely to arise in computer science cases. Cf. Apple Computer v.
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that overlapping windows have become
the clear standard in graphical interfaces and are nonprotectable under the scenes a faire doctrine).
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In contrast, a patent term lasts only twenty years from the date of
filing an application.292 Clearly, the relatively short term of a patent
mitigates concerns over the inaccessibility of patented infrastructure. All
patented inventions fall into the public domain after twenty years; the
positive externalities associated with open access to inventions upon
patent expiration are essential to the basic quid pro quo of the patent
system.293 However, while the relative brevity of the patent term
mitigates concerns over locking up infrastructure, it does not extinguish
them. A one-size-fits-all patent term of twenty years ignores the widely
divergent contributions of various inventions to subsequent
technological development and does not account for how quickly certain
inventions can achieve infrastructural status.
As seen in numerous examples, patented inventions may become
infrastructure well before their patents expire, especially in fast-moving
industries such as biotechnology and information technology. Absent
efficient licensing, discussed below, exclusive rights on this
infrastructure may inhibit myriad downstream applications. Here, my
argument that patent law must better accommodate the evolution of
intellectual infrastructure intersects with empirical evidence
demonstrating the need for such accommodation. I thus offer four
examples of patented inventions that attained infrastructural status well
before expiration of their patent terms: gene splicing, polymerase chain
reaction, human embryonic stem cells, and information technology
standards such as JPEG.
In 1980, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer patented the technique for
gene splicing, the process by which researchers isolate, manipulate, and
reintroduce DNA into cells.294 The process is the bedrock of
recombinant DNA technology and facilitates a wide array of
downstream applications.295 Patent assignee Stanford University
experimented with several licensing arrangements but generally licensed
the technology at a low fee of $10,000.296 The broad utility of the
292. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
293. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 291.
294. See U.S. Patent No. 4,740,470 (filed Apr. 20, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,468,464 (filed Nov.
9, 1978); U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979).
295. Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology
and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 1974−1980, 92 ISIS 541, 542 (2001).
296. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1857, 1871 (2003); Maryann Feldman et al., Commercializing Cohen-Boyer 1980−1997, 20–
23 (Danish Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, DRUID Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005).
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invention coupled with this low license fee led to its widespread
adoption in the biotechnology sector, and as early as seven years after
the patent was issued, recombinant DNA product sales reached $500
million.297 Eleven years after the patent issued, firms were introducing
400 new products annually based on recombinant gene technology.298 In
all, 468 companies licensed the gene splicing patent, which generated
$254 million in licensing revenue over its seventeen-year term.299 Gene
splicing illustrates the immense benefits of wide access to infrastructure:
broad, low-cost licensing of the fundamental gene splicing technology
enabled myriad applications to develop. Given the rapidity of gene
splicing’s adoption, raising licensing fees or otherwise restricting access
to this technology would, in all likelihood, have significantly and
negatively impacted the emergence of the biotechnology industry.
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) offers an illuminating comparison.
In 1987, the private biotechnology company Cetus developed and
patented PCR, a foundational laboratory technique for generating many
copies of particular DNA strands. The immense utility of PCR, coupled
with both reasonably priced licenses and rampant infringement, led to its
broad adoption.300 After a few years, PCR became “an indispensable
research tool employed in nearly every biological field.”301 After PCR
had significantly penetrated the biomedical research sector, Cetus
threatened to aggressively enforce its patent against firms engaged in
pharmaceutical development, and even threatened suit against
noncommercial, academic researchers who shared their PCR-enabled
research with industry.302 While Cetus did not follow through with its
threats, this example demonstrates the risks of strong exclusive rights on
an infrastructural resource subject to rapid and widespread adoption.
Human embryonic stem cells are another technology that achieved
infrastructural status only a few years after patenting.303 James Thomson,

297. Feldman, supra note 296, at 25.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 20, 23. Presently, the patent term is twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
300. Joe Fore, Jr. et al., The Effects of Business Practices, Licensing, and Intellectual Property on
Development and Dissemination of the Polymerase Chain Reaction: Case Study, 1 J. BIOMEDICAL
DISCOVERY AND COLLABORATION 7, *14−15 (July 3, 2006).
301. Id. at *2.
302. See Cetus To Exact Royalties from PCR Sales; Probe Absolves Convicted Rapist, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 5, 1988, at 7.
303. See Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10, at 108; Lee, Paradigm
Shifts, supra note 287, at 692.
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a researcher at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, first isolated and
purified human embryonic stem cells in 1998 and ultimately received
two key patents on this “technology.”304 In a sense, stem cells are the
quintessential infrastructure, for they retain the ability to differentiate
into a wide array of particularized cells and have shown immense
promise as the basis for a broad variety of regenerative therapies.305
Despite only being about half-way through the term of the original
patent, consensus has already developed that these assets are critical to a
broad range of basic experimentation and applications.306
Notwithstanding voluntary arrangements to license these cells to
noncommercial, federally funded researchers on a royalty-free basis,307
access to these cells has not met demand.308 While these patents
currently face challenges on nonobviousness grounds,309 several years of
exclusive rights have no doubt prevented some downstream research and
development from occurring. Successful defense of these challenges
may prolong this inhibition throughout the remaining years of the patent
term.
Standards in information technology are another kind of invention
that can achieve infrastructural status well before the patent term
expires.310 I focus here on “common platform” standards that facilitate

304. U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26,
1998).
CELL
INFORMATION
1
305. See
Nat’l
Insts.
of
Health,
STEM
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf. Although recent advances
indicate that certain adult stem cells can be reprogrammed to function like embryonic stem cells,
many in the scientific community believe that embryonic stem cells are still better suited to serve as
the basis for new therapies. Colin Nickerson, Caution Urged in New Method for Stem Cells:
Harvard Sticks to Cloning, BOST. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1A.
306. See Hazuka, supra note 3, at 164−65 (describing various potential uses of embryonic stem
cells); Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 305 (listing various uses).
307. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the holder of the two stem cell patents, see supra
note 304, signed a Memorandum of Understanding allowing the NIH to retain rights to the ’780
patent because federal grants funded the underlying research. See also Josephine Johnston & Angela
A. Wasunna, Patents, Biomedical Research, and Treatments: Examining Concerns, Canvassing
Solutions, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at s12; Loring & Campbell, supra note 3, at
1717.
308. See, e.g., Singer, Stem Cells Stuck, supra note 3; Loring & Campbell, supra note 3, at 1716–
17.
309. Andrew Pollack, 3 Patents on Stem Cells Are Revoked in Initial Review, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2007, at C2.
310. See generally Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and StandardSetting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Standard-Setting
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interoperability in information technology networks.311 Patents on strong
network standards can create durable market power in these fields.312
The infrastructural nature of standards, which generate immense value
from widespread use by a particular inventive community, has motivated
calls to limit exclusive rights over them.313 While many standard-setting
organizations (SSOs) favor “open” rather than proprietary standards,
patented inventions do find their way into widely adopted standards.314
For example, in 1994, several SSOs created the Joint Photographic
Experts Group (JPEG) standard for compressing photographic images.
Within three years, the standard became a fundamental mass-marketed
technology.315 In 2002, video networking company Forgent Networks
asserted patent rights over the technology underlying JPEG. Forgent
collected over $100 million in royalties before a consortium of
information technology companies challenged the validity of the patent,
resulting in settlement.316 As this episode illustrates, in the context of
patented information technology standards,317 rapid adoption coupled
with strong rights to exclude may allow a single actor to hinder
productivity throughout an entire industry.318 Taken together, these case
studies show that certain patented technologies attain infrastructural
status very quickly, revealing a need to relax exclusive rights during the
patent term.

Organizations].
311. See O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1179 (“[I]n the market for operating systems software,
which exhibits powerful network effects, strong patent protection can create an insurmountable
barrier to entry while also allowing a single patentee to direct innovation in the market for
applications running on the dominant system.”).
312. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 22.
313. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV.
193 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not
To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards].
314. See Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations, supra note 310, at 1893.
315. Priscilla Caplan, Patents and Open Standards, INFO. STANDARDS QUARTERLY, Oct. 2003, at
1, 2.
316. See Kannellos, supra note 6.
317. Although not relevant to JPEG, the problem of patented standards is accentuated where a
single standard is based on multiple patents, thus increasing negotiating and other licensing costs.
See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 152.
318. See Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in Software
Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 230 (2007).
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2.

Challenges Undermining Voluntary Licensing of Patented
Infrastructure

These case studies suggest another mechanism that could in theory
ameliorate patent law’s strict protection of patented infrastructure:
voluntary licensing. However, voluntary arrangements may not provide
adequate access to these foundational technologies. Standard economic
theory generally predicts that patentees will efficiently license
infrastructural technologies to allow all potentially valuable uses to
occur.319 Thus, for example, some may argue that patents on
infrastructural human embryonic stem cells are not problematic because
a licensing market will develop to enable downstream uses of these
assets. However, for a variety of reasons efficient licensing (from a
society-wide perspective) may fail to arise.
First, licensing transactions are complicated by the difficulty of
valuing intellectual infrastructure.320 Valuation difficulties endemic to
technology in general are exacerbated for infrastructural inventions such
as isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells that enable an
extremely broad range of applications.
Second, private transactions will not always reflect the social benefits
of utilizing infrastructure. When an individual uses infrastructure, such
as when a researcher uses human embryonic stem cells to develop a new
therapy, the price charged for the resulting product typically only
captures a portion of the overall social benefit of the innovation. Put
another way, society benefits more from an individual’s use of
infrastructure than that individual benefits herself. Because exploiting
infrastructure produces spillovers that are not appropriable by
transacting parties, patentees will demand higher fees and licensees will
insist on lower fees than would be socially optimal.321
Third, strategic behavior in the form of holdouts by both patentees
and prospective licensees may lead them to forgo deals that actually
serve the best interests of both parties.322

319. See O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1179.
320. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 958; David J. Teece, The Market for KnowHow and the Efficient International Transfer of Technology, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.,
Nov. 1981, at 81, 86.
321. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 257.
322. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19−23 (1982) (discussing
bargaining theory generally); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 350 (rev. 4th ed. 2007).
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Fourth, patentees of infrastructural assets may exercise market power
that leads them to demand supracompetitive prices.323 Infrastructure such
as PCR and established interoperability standards lack adequate
substitutes. Where prospective licensees have made “irreversible
investments” in particular technological platforms, patentees may charge
high licensing fees to exploit this reliance.324 For example, Rambus
apparently attempted to corner the memory chip market by patenting key
memory chips upon learning that they would become the industry
standard.325 Establishing a uniformly high licensing fee is particularly
likely where transaction costs prevent a patentee from negotiating
different prices with different licensees.
Fifth, as Professor Mark Lemley has thoroughly described, licensing
transactions are costly.326 Aggregate transaction costs will be particularly
high for infrastructural inventions needed by many parties.327 Finally,
even if a patentee is willing to license such a technology at competitive
prices, this may be only one of several inventions that a subsequent
exploiter needs to use.328 As Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg have chronicled, the need to bundle licenses from many
different patentees may give rise to a “tragedy of the anticommons”
rendering some downstream lines of development prohibitively

323. Cf. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1058−59. While Lemley discusses
strategic behavior involving an inventor and a subsequent improver, similar behavior may apply to
licenses for users of patented infrastructure who do not intend to improve on the infrastructure. A
monopolist will maximize price where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Because this
monopoly price is higher than the competitive price (assuming a downward-sloping demand curve),
some users will be “priced out” of the market and will not be able to access the good produced by
the monopolist. MERGES ET AL., supra note 322, at 350.
324. Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 154.
325. See In re Rambus Inc., No. 9302, at 3-5, Opinion of the Commission (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006);
Pamela A. MacLean, ‘Rambus’ Ruling is a Standards Landmark, THE NAT’L L. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at
8; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 7, at 837−38.
326. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1053−54; see also MERGES ET AL.,
supra note 322, at 350; FAROK J. CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING:
COMPENSATION, COSTS AND NEGOTIATION 104−05 (1981) (noting that transaction costs averaged
approximately $100,000 for typical licensing arrangements).
327. Extrapolating to “primary” intellectual infrastructure, the transaction costs of licensing
patented natural laws, physical principles, and abstract ideas to all potential users would be
prohibitively high. For these types of assets, prospect theory, which emphasizes the efficiency of
allowing one party to orchestrate the development of a given prospect, is largely inapplicable. See
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977) (discussing prospect theory).
328. See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 152 (describing the problem of
royalty-stacking in the information technology sector).
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expensive.329 In sum, voluntarily licensing may not provide adequate
access to patented intellectual infrastructure.
3.

The Nature of Patent Rights and Their Acquisition

Another potential justification for patent law’s unique approach to
infrastructure is that, unlike trademarks and copyrights, patents do not
implicate First Amendment concerns. Trademarks have become valuable
mechanisms of expression, particularly in popular culture.330
Furthermore, it is well-recognized that the idea-expression dichotomy
plays a critical role in balancing exclusive rights on texts with First
Amendment interests in widely disseminating ideas.331 Perhaps courts
justifiably pay greater attention to the downstream implications of
exclusive rights in trademark and copyright law because of their
potential burdens on speech, a concern that is perceived as absent from
patent law.332 However, concerns over inhibiting speech only strengthen
the principle that intellectual property is and should be attentive to the
implications of upstream exclusive rights on downstream activity.
Furthermore, while the “speech” losses from upstream exclusive rights
are lower in patent law relative to trademark and copyright law, the
“utility” losses from decreased access to foundational technologies are
arguably greater.
Another potential explanation for patent law’s uniquely narrow and
formalistic approach to defining intellectual infrastructure relates to the
substantive hurdles necessary to obtain a patent.333 Unlike trademarks

329. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 698–701. See generally Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621 (1998).
330. See Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 87, at 397.
331. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189−93 (1970).
332. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 237 (1998) (“[P]atent law is qualitatively different from
copyright law because most of the acts it restricts don’t involve speech at all.”). For a potential
counterargument that patents in research science may implicate First Amendment concerns, see
John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
1203, 1252 (1978). See also Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000).
333. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1971) (“[The
patent] monopoly . . . is carefully circumscribed by substantive and procedural protections.”);
O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1184 (observing that copyright law has few requirements for initial
protection but greater flexibility to subsequently limit that protection, while patent law reflects the
reverse situation).
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and copyrights, patents undergo a rigorous examination process.334
Examiners at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) assess whether an
invention satisfies certain statutorily defined criteria, including novelty,
utility, and nonobviousness.335 During prosecution, the PTO may compel
the patent applicant to narrow her claims, thus broadening the space
available to subsequent innovators in the same field.336 One might argue
that these substantive requirements ensure that only inventions that truly
advance the state of the art receive patents and that this is an ideal
outcome. However, this argument misses the point. It is precisely
because some inventions are too meritorious and too valuable that they
become indispensable intellectual infrastructure meriting wide
availability.337 The PTO’s rigorous examination of patentability neither
directly addresses nor mitigates the problem of productivity losses
arising from exclusive rights on productivity-enabling infrastructure.
A further reason for patent law’s divergent approach from trademark
and copyright law relates to differences in the timing of the relevant
intellectual infrastructure inquiries. As a general matter, courts
determine genericity and apply the idea-expression dichotomy and
scenes a faire doctrine in the context of an infringement action. At that
point, usually long after a mark or text has been created, courts have a
wealth of social data from which to draw when analyzing whether
elements of those creations have achieved infrastructural status. For
trademarks, courts consider consumer surveys, market information,
brochures, and dictionaries to ascertain whether a trademark has become
a generic word.338 In copyright law, courts can consider the relative
success of the original work, commonality with other works, and

334. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The Patent and Trademark Office does examine
applications to register trademarks on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). However, this
examination is not nearly as extensive as patent examination, and marks are protectable even
without registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (establishing “false designation of origin”
protection for unregistered marks).
335. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101−103 (2000).
336. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1000−03; Merges & Nelson,
supra note 285, at 843.
337. While I do not articulate here a strict constructivist theory of technology contending that the
meaning of technology is entirely contingent on social perception, such a theory does help
legitimate communal claims over widely needed patented infrastructure. See Cohen, Creativity and
Culture, supra note 35, at 1183−84 (discussing strict constructivist theory relating to texts and
technology).
338. See supra Part III.A; Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2001).
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patterns of social adoption in determining whether specific elements of
that work are stock or standard and thus nonprotectable.
The timing of the analysis is different in patent law. The PTO first
determines patentable subject matter, which is the analogous inquiry into
intellectual infrastructure, at the time of patent issuance.339 At this point,
there is little or no social data on the invention to consider, thus leading
these determinations to be formalistic rather than functionally attentive
to social use. While the issue of patentable subject matter can be
litigated in an infringement action, the statutory design of this
requirement as a threshold condition for patent issuance discourages
considering an invention’s social history and context. An ideal
“infrastructural” analysis would explicitly consider social data on a
patented invention and its adoption in determining whether it merits
liberalized access. Even more, this analysis would be highly
contextualized to specific cases, distinguishing between infrastructural
and non-infrastructural uses of the same patented invention.
Finally, in addition to the problem of timing, courts are naturally
hesitant to invalidate patents on infrastructural inventions because doing
so would undermine incentives to invent. While open access to existing
patented infrastructure helps optimize its exploitation, eliminating patent
rights would discourage future inventors from creating new
infrastructure in the next round of innovation.340 This concern is
inapposite to trademark law, which does not exist to encourage creating
more trademarks. It is attenuated in copyright law, where the cost of
developing “new” ideas and scenes a faire is relatively low. However,
the need to maintain some return on investment is critical to developers
of technological infrastructure, thus counseling against simply relegating
such inventions to the public domain.
As we have seen, the relatively brief term of protection, availability of
licensing, perceived absence of First Amendment concerns, and
substantive examination process characteristic of patents do not justify
patent law’s rigid approach to intellectual infrastructure. However, the
timing of patent law’s infrastructure inquiry and the need to maintain
incentives to invent are key differences that warrant attention. A recent
Supreme Court case offers solutions to both the problems of timing and

339. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
340. Cf. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting
that subjecting research tools to the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) research exception would compromise
incentives to invent those foundational technologies).
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incentives, thus opening the door for a more nuanced and functional
approach to identifying and protecting patented intellectual
infrastructure. In so doing, it provides a guide for fruitfully navigating
the wide gray area between open access and exclusive rights to allow for
use-specific, compensation-dependent access to patented infrastructure.
IV. INCORPORATING INFRASTRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN
DETERMINING PATENT INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES: A
PROPOSAL FOR APPLYING eBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE,
L.L.C.
A.

Denying Injunctions and Allowing Liability Rule Protection for
Infrastructural Uses of Patented Inventions

Viewed through the lens of infrastructure theory, the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. provides an
immensely valuable framework for liberalizing access to patented
infrastructure on a dynamic basis.341 In eBay, the Supreme Court
provided courts with greater flexibility to deny injunctions in patent
infringement cases, thus opening the door for protecting patented
inventions with a liability rule rather than a property rule.342 I propose a
two-tiered system in which courts continue to protect ordinary
inventions serving a non-infrastructural role with a property rule (via
injunctive relief) but protect patented inventions serving as infrastructure
with a liability rule (via royalties) in certain circumstances.343 Applying
this proposal, courts should deny injunctions in cases of patent
infringement that meet three criteria: (1) the infringed patent claims an
infrastructural invention, (2) the infringer is actually using the patented
invention in an infrastructural manner, and (3) the patented invention is
not reasonably available through licensing.344 In such cases, denying
injunctions creates the opportunity for continued infringement of an
infrastructural resource contingent on the defendant paying courtdetermined royalties. However, my proposal would preserve ample
opportunities for parties to voluntarily negotiate a license, but against the
341. 547 U.S. __ , 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
342. See id. at 1839.
343. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1092 (describing entitlements as protected by
either a property or liability rule).
344. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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changed background of liability rules rather than property rules.
Ultimately, this proposal builds a valuable social feedback mechanism
into patent law. It provides use-specific, compensation-dependent access
to patented technologies that become infrastructure during the patent
term, thus promoting downstream productivity while maintaining
upstream incentives to invent.
1.

The eBay Decision

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. significantly changed the law of
patent remedies.345 In that case, eBay and Half.com, a wholly owned
subsidiary, infringed MercExchange’s business method patent for an
electronic market.346 However, the district court denied MercExchange’s
motion for permanent injunctive relief.347 The Federal Circuit reversed,
applying its “‘general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.’”348 On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit. Writing for the
majority, Justice Thomas held that the decision to grant or deny
injunctive relief rests within the discretion of the district court,
consistent with traditional equitable principles.349 Within this
framework,
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.350
eBay is a simple holding with profound implications. Courts are no
longer constrained to a syllogism wherein patent infringement leads
inexorably to an injunction. The possibility of denying an injunction and
345. While the law changed significantly, there is open debate as to whether courts will
substantially deviate from the general practice of granting injunctions. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __,
126 S. Ct. at 1841−42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that courts will continue to grant
injunctions in most patent infringement cases).
346. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
347. Id. at 715.
348. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S.Ct. at 1839 (quoting MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339).
349. Id. at 1841.
350. Id. at 1839.
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allowing infringement to continue contingent on paying royalties—in
essence, protecting a patent with a liability rule—offers important
flexibility to courts.351 In particular, eBay opens the door for a social
feedback mechanism in patent law that relaxes exclusive rights on
inventions that become infrastructure.
I argue that courts in patent infringement cases should consider the
infrastructural use of a patented invention within the eBay framework,
denying injunctive relief where appropriate to allow continued use of
foundational technologies. The first eBay factor, irreparable harm to the
plaintiff, may be difficult to establish by patentees of infrastructural
technologies. Continued infringement by a particular user (who must pay
an ongoing royalty) does not prevent the patentee from licensing to other
users.352 Furthermore, the “upstream” nature of infrastructure means that
infringing users typically operate in “downstream” markets and do not
directly compete with the patentee. Because the infringer and patentee
do not directly compete with each other, denying an injunction will not
cause the patentee to lose brand name recognition or market share,
factors that ordinarily weigh towards establishing irreparable harm.353
For related reasons, it will be difficult for patentees of infrastructural
technologies to establish the second factor, the inadequacy of legal
remedies. Without losing brand name recognition or market share, for
which an injunction would be an appropriate remedy, monetary damages
should be sufficient to compensate the patentee. While calculating
damages is difficult, these difficulties are surmountable and would not
render legal remedies inadequate.354
Within eBay’s equitable framework, the third (relative hardship of an
injunction) and fourth (public interest) factors are particularly relevant
for determining that a patented invention serving as infrastructure should
not receive injunctive protection.355 Regarding the third factor, the
relative hardship of an injunction will fall heavily on the defendant, for
whom the patented item is indispensable for a particular line of research
or development. Downstream parties enjoined from using polymerase
chain reaction, embryonic stem cells, and patented interoperability
standards would be severely hampered in their productive pursuits.

351. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21.
352.
353.
354.
355.
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See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
See id.
See infra Part IV.E.
See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
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Under eBay, courts also consider the availability of other remedies to a
patentee in determining the relative hardship of an injunction. In many
cases, monetary damages will be adequate to compensate patentees, thus
lessening their relative hardship.
The fourth factor, the public interest, counsels even more strongly
against enjoining infrastructural use of patented inventions. Inventive
communities benefit greatly from access to infrastructure because of its
productivity-enhancing qualities, wide ranging applicability, and general
lack of substitutes. Furthermore, because inventors typically capture
only a small proportion of the social value of their inventions, the
widespread use of infrastructure generates immense spillovers benefiting
society at large.356 Additionally, allowing liability rule protection will
not overly compromise the public’s interest in maintaining incentives to
invent.357 Under this proposed application of eBay, infringement is not
free. Infringers who are not enjoined must pay damages to patentees for
any ongoing use, thus allowing patentees to recoup their investment
costs and encouraging future innovation.358
In considering the public interest, courts should also consider nonpatent incentives driving the creation of particular inventions. Patents
provide incentives to invent, but they also impose a social cost,
measured by the access constraints enabled by exclusive rights. To the
extent that exclusive rights are not necessary to motivate invention, these
distributional losses are not socially justified. In a significant number of
instances—particularly in biotechnology—the federal government has
funded the development of infrastructural technologies that are then
patented.359 Federal funding of inventions severely attenuates the
incentive rationale for patents, and such public funding should militate

356. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 268−70.
357. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that
public policy favors enforcing patent rights).
358. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504−05 (1994).
359. The National Institutes of Health provide $28 billion in funding for basic scientific research
every year. NIH - Overview, http://www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html (last visited Dec. 17,
2007). Indeed, the NIH funded a considerable portion of the research leading to James Thomson’s
patents on human embryonic stem cells. Federally funded researchers enjoy a “double bonus”
because of the federal Bayh-Dole Act, which allows recipients of federal funds to patent any
inventions arising from taxpayer-supported research. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000 & Supp. V
2005). See generally Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
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against protecting resulting inventions with an injunction.360 Although
much more difficult to analyze, where the incentives of self-use and selfbenefit have motivated a patentee to develop an invention, the rationale
for strict property rule protection of that patent is also undermined.361
In sum, courts should consider infrastructural use of a patented
invention when applying eBay, with such use weighing against granting
an injunction and in favor of maintaining access to that foundational
technology. This proposal does not represent a radical departure from
existing precedent, but arises organically within the eBay framework.
Indeed, considering the infrastructural use of a patented invention is
arguably necessary under eBay’s equitable test.
2.

The Proposed Application of eBay

This proposed application of eBay aims to promote inventive activity
and only applies to a relatively narrow set of situations involving
patented infrastructure. This proposal creates two tiers of patent
protection. Ordinary patented inventions not used as infrastructure
would continue to be subject to traditional property rule protection upon
infringement. However, infrastructural use of a foundational patented
technology would, on a case-by-case basis, militate against imposing an
injunction if that technology is not otherwise reasonably available
through voluntary licensing.
Accordingly, for courts to deny injunctions and allow liability rule
protection in cases of patent infringement, three conditions must be
satisfied. First, a patented invention must qualify as intellectual
infrastructure, meaning it must be: (1) a nonrival resource, (2) valuable
primarily for its enabling capabilities, and (3) a means to a wide variety
of downstream applications.362 Second, the infringer must be using the
invention in an infrastructural capacity, taking advantage of its particular
enabling properties. Third, a court must conclude that efficient licensing
360. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 359, at 300.
361. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, (Mar.
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969399.
362. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956. These factors suggest an implicit
fourth factor characterizing infrastructure: lack of adequate substitutes. For example, the industrywide “irreversible investments” made in adopting a patented standard such as JPEG may render
other standards inadequate substitutes. See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at
154. In other cases, the unique properties of the infrastructural invention, as with human embryonic
stem cells, make it nearly impossible to substitute. In still other cases, the sheer technological
ingenuity of an invention helps it both enable a wide array of downstream applications and render
any potential substitutes inadequate, as with gene splicing.
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and attendant widespread accessibility has not and is not likely to occur.
This means that voluntary, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing,
either directly by the patentee, or as mediated by a standard-setting
organization,363 would not trigger liability rule protection. This proposal
allows parties to voluntarily license their patented infrastructure widely,
but preserves the possibility of a liability rule as a backstop if such
licensing does not arise.
Regarding the first condition, the range of patented technologies
qualifying as infrastructure would be narrow but significant. Familiar
examples include gene splicing, polymerase chain reaction, human
embryonic stem cells, and information technology standards.364
Comparing these technologies indicates that two classes of technologies
would satisfy the threshold determination as “infrastructure.” The first
class includes patented technologies whose widespread licensing and
adoption clearly establishes their infrastructural status. Low-cost
licensing of gene splicing and no-cost licensing of the JPEG standard
engendered widespread adoption and reliance, helping these assets
become infrastructure. My proposal would prevent patentees from
subsequently exploiting this reliance by significantly raising licensing
fees or otherwise restricting access to these inventions, a strategy that
Cetus and Forgent attempted with PCR and the JPEG standard,
respectively.365 My approach is conceptually related to estoppel, but
would not require any element of patentee deception.366 In this manner,
the custom of biomedical researchers and software developers of using
patented infrastructure at reasonable cost would remain undisturbed, like
the public’s tradition of using a particular open field for a communal
dance.367
However, correlating a liability rule with widespread adoption of an
invention may discourage a patentee from licensing it widely in the first
place, which is far from ideal. Therefore, this proposal would also apply

363. Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 156−57.
364. See supra Part III.D.1. While empirical evidence from the biotechnology sector suggests that
patentees often refrain from suing basic researchers who infringe their patents, my proposal offers a
sustainable and simple doctrinal solution that does not rely on the unpredictable forbearance of
patentees to ensure access to proprietary infrastructure. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents (July
3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999961.
365. See supra Part III.D.1.
366. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir.
1980).
367. See Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 760.
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to a second class of inventions: patented technologies whose limited
availability has demonstrated a significant potential for widespread
infrastructural use.368 For example, while licensed selectively, the early
availability of human embryonic stem cells established their immense
potential as basic research and development infrastructure. Such
inventions would also qualify as infrastructure.
In tandem, these two classes address the chicken-and-egg problem of
what comes first—widespread social adoption or infrastructural status.
Inventions that have achieved infrastructural status, as well as those that
would achieve that status “but for” their limited availability, would both
satisfy the threshold classification as infrastructure.
Regarding the second condition, liability rule protection would only
be available in cases where an infringer is using an infrastructural
invention as infrastructure. As we have seen from trademark and
copyright law, what is infrastructure in one context may be protectable
application in another. Thus, in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., the word
“aspirin” was generic for lay consumers but a particularized trademark
for chemists, physicians, and druggists.369 Similarly, in copyright, a
Swiss bank account may constitute a scene a faire in an international
espionage story but may be protectable expression in a tale about
invading aliens. Accordingly, using patented infrastructural technology
for non-infrastructural uses would not trigger liability rule protection.
For example, using human embryonic stem cells to develop a therapy for
Parkinson’s disease that exploits the unique properties of those cells
would constitute an infrastructural use. Experimenting on stem cells to
investigate the general properties of cell membranes, where other types
of cells would be adequate substitutes for such research, would
constitute a non-infrastructural use. This proposal for applying eBay is
based on the premise that liberal access to infrastructure promotes
productivity. Accordingly, only those uses of infrastructural inventions
that take advantage of their unique enabling capabilities would qualify
for liability rule treatment.
Finally, potential liability rule protection would not be available if the
invention were available to the infringer through reasonable and
nondiscriminatory licensing. Court-determined ongoing royalties are

368. Cf. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 534, 593 (2003) (“[I]f it seems clear that a single standard will emerge as dominant, the law
should facilitate competition within . . . the platform standard by allowing horizontal access.”).
369. 272 F. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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designed to address situations where negotiations have failed, not to
replace market transactions. While determining the reasonableness of a
prevailing licensing fee is no easy task, courts could rely on established
doctrinal frameworks for determining reasonable royalties to guide
them.370
In this context, it is important to stress that this proposal preserves
ample opportunities for parties to voluntarily negotiate a license, thus
incorporating the Federal Circuit’s recommended approach to
implementing eBay.371 Whereas the threat of an injunction skews the
balance of power in favor of a patentee,372 negotiating in the shadow of a
potential liability rule provides more leverage for a prospective licensee
to demand lower licensing fees.373 Before litigation, the murky prospect
of receiving damages upon a finding of infringement may encourage
patentees to reduce or simply pay the transaction costs necessary to
strike deals with willing licensees. While potential liability rule
protection may be perceived as decreasing the incentives of prospective
licensees to negotiate (because they can simply hold out for a courtdetermined royalty), the uncertainty, length, and cost of litigation still
provide ample motivation for these parties to actually negotiate licenses.
My proposal is best understood not as a substitute for private ordering,
but as an action-forcing mechanism that will motivate patentees to come
to the negotiating table and rationalize the balance of power once they
get there.
At the close of litigation, if a court has denied an injunction under
eBay, another opportunity for negotiation arises. In this situation, judges
should encourage parties to voluntarily negotiate a license against the
backdrop of imminent court-determined royalties. Relative to
negotiations before litigation, the certainty that a court will impose an
ongoing royalty (coupled with uncertainty as to the terms of the royalty)
may motivate a patentee and prospective licensee to strike a deal. This
process of utilizing a court-determined liability rule solely as a last resort
encourages parties to voluntarily agree to terms.
370. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(establishing a fifteen-factor framework for determining reasonable royalties); infra Part IV.E.
371. See Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In most
cases, where the district court determines that a permanent injunction is not warranted, the district
court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use
of a patented invention before imposing an ongoing royalty.”).
372. MERGES ET AL., supra note 322, at 349.
373. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 795.
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Merits Relative to Other Potential Solutions

The primary advantage of this proposal is the use of liability rules to
provide mediated access to patented technologies.374 This proposal
provides for compensation-dependent, use-specific access to patented
infrastructure when mixed supply-side and demand-side considerations
render a binary choice between open access and exclusive rights
inadequate. This proposal differs from suggestions to simply place
infrastructural technologies in the public domain375 and offers an
analytically robust method for handling “difficult” cases of infrastructure
access.
Generic words, literary ideas, natural laws, physical phenomena, and
abstract technical ideas are clear candidates for open access based on
both supply-side and demand-side considerations. From the supply side,
exclusive rights are generally perceived as unnecessary for producing
generic words, ideas, and basic scientific knowledge.376 From the
demand side, these foundational assets enable such a wide range of
downstream uses that users’ interest in freely accessing them is high.
Thus, there are relatively few disadvantages and many advantages to
maintaining this primary infrastructure in the public domain.
The situation is more complex for patented infrastructural
technologies such as isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells.
From the supply side, this “value-added” infrastructure is costly to
develop, and simply equating infrastructure with open access would
undermine incentives to invent.377 From the demand side, these
374. Others have also argued in favor of liability rules to provide compensation to innovators
while allowing access to protected innovations. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 358, at 2504−05;
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2370 (1994). My proposal is unique in situating liability rule protection for
patented infrastructure within the Supreme Court’s eBay framework.
375. Cf. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 922−23; Frischmann & Lemley, supra
note 26, at 282 (“Frischmann’s organizing heuristic is ‘if infrastructure, then commons.’”).
376. This is, of course, a highly debatable premise. However, intrinsic motivations to create,
government funding of basic research, and norms of non-exclusivity in academic science suggest
that economic incentives may not be as necessary to produce this primary infrastructure. See
MERTON, supra note 153, at 270−78 (discussing traditional scientific norms such as
disinterestedness, according to which scientists do not pursue basic research for financial gain);
Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) (stating that pecuniary incentives
do not motivate basic scientific research). Furthermore, while companies invest considerable
resources to create new marks that become generic words, trademark law does not exist to
encourage new trademarks, and neologisms generally arise organically from culture, free of charge.
See Lemley, Lanham Act, supra note 39, at 1695.
377. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 282 (“One cannot automatically make the
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infrastructural assets enable a smaller range of downstream applications
than “primary” infrastructure such as natural laws, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas. Furthermore, some downstream uses of these assets
may be non-infrastructural. Therefore, the argument for categorically
relegating these infrastructural technologies to the public domain is
attenuated. For these difficult cases, my proposal addresses supply-side
needs to maintain incentives to invent by compelling an infringer of
patented infrastructure to compensate the patentee.378 Regarding the
demand side, the fact-intensive and case-specific eBay analysis can
distinguish between non-infrastructural and infrastructural uses of
patented inventions, leading courts to only exempt the latter from
injunctive relief.
This proposal also offers advantages relative to a compulsory
licensing scheme, where Congress or an agency would determine pre-set
fees for licensing patented infrastructure.379 It is not clear how a rulemaking body would define, a priori, the kinds of inventions that should
be subject to infrastructural treatment. Given the rapid dynamics of the
biotechnology and information technology sectors, as well as the fact
that infrastructural status is highly use specific, courts are in a better
position to identify infrastructural uses of patented technology on a caseby-case basis. Further arguing against compulsory licenses is Professor
Robert Merges’s observation that such licenses discourage industry
players from resolving patent issues through voluntary negotiations.380
The possibility that a court will apply liability rules at the end of a long
and expensive patent infringement suit leaves enough flexibility (and
uncertainty) to motivate parties to negotiate a license before any
contemplated infringement.

infrastructure-commons equation, particularly where IP is concerned, since producers need some
incentive to innovate.”).
378. This proposal would rely on existing measures of damages, which at a minimum award a
“reasonable royalty” to the patentee. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). For firms that first licensed widely
and then increased fees, prior licensing fees would provide a guide for reasonable royalties.
Disgorging all profits based on unjust enrichment would overly deter unlicensed use of patented
infrastructure and would thus be inappropriate. See Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199, 218 (2001).
379. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (establishing a compulsory license fee schedule for recording
cover songs).
380. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1391−92 (1996) [hereinafter Merges,
Liability Rules].
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Courts’ Attentiveness to Downstream Progress in the Wake of
eBay

Early decisions in the wake of eBay reflect courts’ newfound
attentiveness to the downstream implications of upstream patents and
illustrate the workability of the proposal advanced here.381 In z4
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,382 a jury found that Microsoft’s
Windows and Office software products infringed z4’s patents on
software activation technology.383 However, the district court denied
z4’s motion for injunctive relief. Applying the balance of hardships test,
the court observed that an injunction against Microsoft would necessitate
re-releasing 450 versions of Office and 600 versions of Windows.384 The
court also found that damages could adequately compensate z4 for the
infringement385 and concluded that the balance of hardships from an
injunction favored Microsoft.386 Regarding the public interest, the court
gave substantial weight to the widespread use of Windows and Office
and to the worldwide implications of a mandatory re-release.387 The
court found that enjoining Microsoft could disrupt its product
distribution and if so, “would have an effect on the public due to the
public’s undisputed and enormous reliance on these products.”388 Given
the public’s widespread adoption of these products, the potential
productivity losses from a re-release, and the absence of significant
public benefits arising from an injunction, the court concluded that the
public interest weighed against enjoining Microsoft’s infringement.389
Considerations of downstream productivity led the court to protect z4’s
patented invention with a liability rule rather than a property rule.390

381. This contextual examination of a patented technology’s impact on society finds some
parallel in calls for agencies to better incorporate social context when making decisions in the realm
of environmental law and policy. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered
Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1152−53
(1997).
382. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
383. Id. at 438. The jury also found that co-defendant Autodesk had infringed z4’s patents. Id.
384. Id. at 442.
385. Id. at 441–42.
386. Id. at 442−44.
387. Id. at 443 (“Microsoft’s Windows and Office software products are likely the most popular
software products in the world.”).
388. Id. at 443−44 (emphasis added).
389. Id. at 444.
390. Microsoft had indicated that it would phase out all infringing products starting with the
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Similarly, in Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 391 a jury found that Toyota
had infringed Paice’s patents on hybrid engine technology, but the
district court denied Paice’s request for an injunction.392 Invoking eBay,
the court noted that the balance of hardships favored Toyota.393 If Paice
received the permanent injunction, “[t]he burgeoning hybrid market
could . . . be stifled as the research and expense of bringing [Toyota’s]
product line to market would be frustrated.”394 Here, productivity
concerns led the court to protect Paice’s patented invention with an
ongoing royalty rather than an injunction.395
Of course, one must place these decisions in context. Paice was
arguably a “patent troll,” as it did not actually practice the patents upon
which it was suing.396 Additionally, in both cases, the patented
technologies represented relatively small components of larger
inventions—Microsoft Office and Windows in z4 and hybrid cars in
Paice.397 While courts should consider status as a “troll” and a relatively
small contribution to a larger invention in applying eBay, these factors
will not necessarily apply to all cases of alleged infringement of patented
infrastructure.
In one important way, however, these decisions go beyond the
proposal developed here. Significantly, neither z4 nor Paice involved
intellectual infrastructure. Both inventions are nonrival inputs into
downstream development. However, while the product activation
component at issue in z4 was ultimately widely used, neither it nor the
hybrid transmission claimed in Paice is so foundational to a broad array
of downstream uses that it represents infrastructure. These were direct
inputs to end-user goods, software and cars. Unlike infrastructural assets
release of Windows 2007 and Office 2007. Thus, the royalty rate was calculated for prospective
sales over the two- to three-year phase-out period. Id. at 442. Ultimately, the jury awarded damages
of $115 million against Microsoft and $18 million against co-defendant Autodesk. Id. at 438−39.
391. No. 2:04-CV-211-DE, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
392. Id.
393. Id. at *6.
394. Id.
395. On appeal, the Federal Circuit subsequently reversed and remanded to allow the district
court to clarify its calculation of the ongoing royalty. Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006-1610,
-1631, 2007 WL 3024994, at *19 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).
396. Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *2 (“Plaintiff does not manufacture competing vehicles, but
rather is geared toward licensing its technology . . . .”).
397. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Paice, 2006
WL 2385139, at *5; see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.__, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842
(2006).
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such as gene splicing, PCR, human embryonic stem cells, and
information technology standards, these technologies do not enable wide
swaths of downstream productivity in innovation markets. The fact that
concern for follow-on productivity motivated courts to protect noninfrastructural inventions with liability rules renders it even more
persuasive, a fortiori, that they should protect infrastructural inventions
with liability rules.
D.

Advantages Relative to Current Practice and Other Intellectual
Property Disciplines

Allowing courts to consider infrastructural uses of patented inventions
in determining whether to apply liability rule protection has several
advantages. First, relative to current patent practice, determining
intellectual infrastructure at the point of infringement allows courts to
consider instructive social data on an invention. The PTO assesses
patentable subject matter at the time of patent issuance. At this point, it
is relatively easy to determine the formal “first layer” of intellectual
infrastructure by inquiring if the patent claims a natural law, physical
phenomenon, or abstract idea. At this early stage, however, it is almost
impossible to predict what inventions, such as gene splicing or
polymerase chain reaction, will become so widely needed and so
indispensable for downstream development that they will constitute
intellectual infrastructure. The invention at that time simply lacks the
history necessary to make such a determination. Analyzing intellectual
infrastructure at the time of infringement allows courts to consider a
history of demonstrated social adoption and reliance, as well as an
informative history of licensing.
Second, folding the infrastructural inquiry into remedies analysis
enables highly specific remedies. The four-factor equitable test at the
heart of eBay shuns bright line, formalistic rules and encourages courts
to consider context when determining infringement remedies.398 As
discussed, whether or not a resource serves as infrastructure is highly
contextual.399 Under this proposal, liability rule protection is use-specific
and would not apply to infringers using foundational technologies in a
non-infrastructural capacity.400 This is not a “pay-for-play” compulsory
398. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
399. See supra Part IV.A.2.
400. My approach has some similarities to the fair use doctrine that Professor Maureen O’Rourke
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license scheme in which certain patented inventions would be available
for all uses upon payment of a fee.401
Third, this framework particularly addresses strategic behavior by
patent trolls holding patents on key infrastructure. In his concurring
opinion in eBay, Justice Kennedy discussed patent trolls—firms that
hold but do not practice patents, generating revenue through licensing
fees and suing other firms for infringement.402 Such firms routinely use
the threat of an injunction to inflate their licensing fees and proposed
settlement amounts.403 Since trolls do not practice inventions,
infringement by competitors does not erode their market share, thus
rendering royalties an adequate remedy. For this and the reasons
mentioned above, the relative hardship of an injunction in such cases
would weigh heavily in favor of defendants. In addition, allowing firms
that do not even practice their patents to exploit social reliance on these
inventions to charge supracompetitive prices does not serve the public
interest. Allowing liability rule protection for patented intellectual
infrastructure held by trolls will help mitigate their threats of holdout.
Finally, relative to copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy, this
approach offers a more intellectually honest means of protecting
intellectual infrastructure. Courts take a functional approach to the ideaexpression dichotomy, characterizing an element of an expressive work
as an “idea” when they determine that it should be preserved in the
public domain.404 Similarly, courts could take a wholly functional
approach to interpreting the meaning of “natural laws, physical

suggests for patent law. See O’Rourke, supra note 22. However, my proposal differs from
O’Rourke’s in both ends and means. O’Rourke, writing before eBay, recommended sui generis
Congressional action to codify a fair use defense for patent law. Here, I situate infrastructure
analysis within the now-existing eBay framework, which itself draws upon traditional equitable
principles. See id. at 1210. Additionally, while O’Rourke focuses on the fair use doctrine’s
emphasis on market failure, I draw from parallel regimes of relaxed protection of intellectual
infrastructure in trademark, copyright, and patent.
401. See Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631, 2007 WL 3024994, at *33
n.13 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (“The term ‘compulsory license’ implies that anyone who meets
certain criteria has congressional authority to use that which is licensed . . . . By contrast, the
ongoing royalty order at issue here is limited to one particular set of defendants.”).
402. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (“An industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
403. See id. at 1842 (noting that for patentees, “an injunction, and the potentially serious
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees
to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
404. See supra notes 228−232 and accompanying text.
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phenomena, and abstract ideas” to keep certain technologies in the
public domain.405 For example, courts could label human embryonic
stem cells as nonpatentable “natural phenomena” and characterize
information technology standards as “abstract ideas” to deny exclusive
rights and promote downstream productivity. While demand-side
considerations support such an interpretation,406 it is open to criticisms
applying to the idea-expression dichotomy as being subjective and
lacking analytical rigor.407 The JPEG standard does not become an
abstract idea simply because its broad utility counsels that it should be
widely available. Following Diamond v. Diehr, it is preferable to retain
some analytical rigor around the threshold categories of patentable
subject matter and to reserve further determinations of intellectual
infrastructure for a separate inquiry.408
E.

Potential Critiques and Responses

Of course, this proposal must address several critiques. First,
differentiating between intellectual infrastructure and application is
highly technical and raises institutional competence questions for
courts.409 However, the downstream productivity analyses in z4 and
Paice suggest that courts are capable of determining when liberalized
access is warranted for patented upstream infrastructure.410 Just as courts
in genericide cases consider market data, consumer surveys, and
industry information in determining whether a trademark has become
generic, courts in patent cases could consider similar evidence to
determine whether a particular use of a patented invention is
infrastructural. To address technical limitations, courts may also
consider input from expert witnesses, SSOs, and agencies.411
Second, the possibility of losing property rule protection upon
widespread adoption of a patented infrastructural technology
compromises a patentee’s incentives to develop that invention in the first
place.412 This decreases incentives to invent precisely the kind of
405. See Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10.
406. Id.
407. See supra notes 219–226 and accompanying text.
408. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981).
409. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 839−41.
410. See supra Part IV.C.
411. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 839−41.
412. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 946; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note
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infrastructural inventions that arguably contribute most to technological
progress.413 However, aside from any explicit consideration of
intellectual infrastructure, eBay already introduces uncertainty into how
courts will resolve patent infringement suits.414 Firms now face a general
risk that their patented inventions will be protected by a liability rule
rather than a property rule upon infringement. The present proposal
simply applies this flexibility in the helpful direction of allowing courts
to allow infrastructural uses of patented technologies to continue. Most
importantly, ongoing royalties mitigate the incentives problem:
infringers will still have to compensate patentees—in some cases on
terms the patentee has previously approved.
Third, awarding damages gives rise to complicated valuation
problems.415 As discussed, calculating appropriate royalties will be
particularly difficult given the complexity of valuing infrastructure.416
However, for infrastructural technologies that patentees have already
licensed widely, royalties will correlate with previous licensing fees
already adopted by the patentee. For the second class of technologies
subject to this proposal, a limited history of licensing can guide courts in
calculating appropriate royalties. It bears emphasizing that damages are
the only remedy available for infringement occurring before litigation,
so regardless of the imposition of a permanent injunction, courts cannot
avoid the difficulties of valuing technology.417 District courts and the
Federal Circuit have developed a sophisticated jurisprudence for
calculating damages, and the valuation challenges do not appear to be

10; see Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 798.
413. See generally Lee, Paradigm Shifts, supra note 287 (arguing that, at a macroscopic level,
strict patent protection of upstream assets may encourage paradigm shifts at the level of basic
theory, thus helping science advance in the most revolutionary manner). The analysis here and in
my other work calling for increased access to upstream inventions must be balanced against the rare
but significant gains to be achieved from paradigm shifts resulting from compelling inventors to
“design around” existing infrastructure. See generally Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific
Discovery, supra note 10.
414. See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 167. But see eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.__, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841–42 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(suggesting that a “long tradition of equity practice” will lead courts to continue granting
injunctions in most patent infringement cases)
415. See supra, Part III.D.2; cf. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1762−63 (2004) (arguing that information costs, including those related to valuation, render
property rules preferable to liability rules).
416. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 958.
417. MERGES ET AL., supra note 322, at 349.
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insurmountable.418 Again, courts could also consider the input of expert
witnesses, SSOs, and agencies to help determine appropriate liability
rule protection.419
F.

Summary: A Social Feedback Mechanism for Patent Law

This proposed application of the eBay framework would bring patent
law closer to its intellectual property siblings in accommodating the
evolution of intellectual infrastructure. One could liken it to a doctrine of
genericide for patents. If an invention becomes indispensable to a wide
range of downstream applications, the patentee’s exclusive rights over it
become attenuated. In a sense, innovative firms would be penalized for
creating technologies that are so useful that they attain infrastructural
status. This is analogous to genericide, where widespread use of a
trademarked name can produce a term that is so valuable for general
linguistic purposes that the trademark owner loses its exclusive rights.420
One could also analogize this proposal to a doctrine of scenes a faire for
patents. If a patented invention becomes “stock” or “standard” for
conducting a wide range of valuable downstream research, it becomes
subject to liberalized access.421
418. There are two prevailing methods for calculating damages: lost profits and reasonable
royalties. To establish lost profits, a patentee must show: (1) demand for the patented product, (2)
the absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to
exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit the patentee would have made. Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). Because lost profits may be
particularly difficult to calculate on a prospective basis, and because some patentees (such as
universities) may lack manufacturing and marketing capability to practice their patents, reasonable
royalties will generally be the preferred method of calculating damages under this proposal.
Calculating a reasonable royalty “contemplates a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and
the infringer at a time before the infringement began.” Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298
F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002). While this involves a legal fiction, the widely adopted fifteenfactor test articulated in Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp. provides guidance for determining a
reasonable royalty. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (including, as the fifteenth factor,
“[t]he amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have
agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying
to reach an agreement . . . .”).
419. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 840−41.
420. See supra Part III.A.
421. This proposal is conceptually similar to antitrust law’s essential facilities doctrine, which
“imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm
reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with
the first.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991). See
Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 963; Waller & Frischmann, supra note 76; see
generally Robert Pitofsky, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust Law,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/pitofskyrobert.pdf; cf. Lee, Inverting the
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However, this proposal takes the unique characteristics of patent law
into account and moves beyond a binary choice between open access
and exclusive rights. It relies on voluntary negotiation and liability rules
to provide qualified, compensation-dependent access to patented
infrastructure.422 Instructive in this regard, courts in copyright cases have
long endorsed liability rules to ensure downstream access to protected
content while providing compensation to upstream creators.423 However,
this Article’s proposal is more explicitly infrastructural in its orientation
and seeks to liberalize access to generally needed “basic building
blocks” of invention. This application of eBay thus solves two problems.
It allows for a nuanced, contextual, and historical evaluation of whether
a patented invention functions as intellectual infrastructure at the time of
infringement. It also offers the flexibility of protecting that invention
with a liability rule, thus balancing incentives to invent with access to
foundational resources that facilitate invention.
In sum, intellectual infrastructure and its responsiveness to evolving
social practice reveal a natural limitation on exclusive rights in
intangible entities. Rhetorical tropes such as the entrepreneurial firm,
romantic author, and inventive genius have historically justified
expansive intellectual property rights.424 However, intellectual property
is not a natural right, but exists to promote society-wide progress.425
Firms, authors, and inventors may receive exclusive rights on their
creations, but those rights may not confer too much power. At a primary
level, certain “raw” inputs, such as words, ideas, and natural principles,
are preserved in the public domain as intellectual infrastructure.
Infrastructure, however, is socially defined and consequently evolves.
Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10, at 84 (arguing that a lack of substitutes for a patented
research tool should weigh in favor of liberalizing access to it).
422. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 785 (“Stated simply, where property rules have
pernicious consequences, liability rules look better by comparison.”).
423. See supra note 117.
424. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain Part I, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 11−12 (1993); Keith Aoki, Authors,
Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part II, 18
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191 (1993); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53–59 (1996); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965 (1990).
425. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 355 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (“Considering the
exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well
the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment
of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”).
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Accordingly, doctrines aimed at preserving wide access to infrastructure
should respond to accommodate this evolution. Firms may trademark
names, but if those names enter the vernacular as generic words, they
become freely appropriable to competitors and the public at large.
Authors may copyright their texts, but common ideas and well-traveled
expressions considered stock or standard are not protectable. Under the
proposal here, inventions that become standard platforms for subsequent
innovation would be open to downstream inventors on a liberalized, but
not free, basis. Society at large, which imbues these creations with
value,426 has certain claims on their availability.427 Where the community
holds its public dances matters and may limit the exclusive rights
claimed by the landowner.
CONCLUSION
To promote productivity, trademark, copyright, and patent law all
distinguish between upstream intellectual infrastructure and downstream
intellectual application. Trademark law ensures open access to generic
words and only allows exclusive rights on terms that identify individual
sources. Copyright law preserves ideas and stock expressions in the
public domain, only granting protection to particularized expressions.
Patent law maintains the free availability of natural laws, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas while only permitting ownership of
refined inventions. Intellectual infrastructure, which comprises nonrival
assets valuable as inputs to a wide array of downstream uses, remains
open to all.
Infrastructure, however, is a moving target. Accordingly, this Article
has compared doctrines ensuring access to intellectual infrastructure
based on their responsiveness to infrastructural evolution. Trademark’s
doctrine of genericide is highly attentive to linguistic change and relies
on timely social data to determine if and when a protected mark has
become a generic word. Copyright law occupies an intermediate
426. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1588 n.277 (1992–1993) (noting that
trademark owners and consumers are joint producers of promotional value and goodwill). While
Professor Gordon argues that consumers have a particularly prominent role in creating value in the
trademark context, she acknowledges that “even standard intellectual products . . . will be beneficial
only if someone appreciates them; labor is never the only source of value, even for Locke.” Id.
427. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be
Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 123, 142 (1996).
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position. As society’s notion of common ideas and “stock” elements
evolves, so does the repository of resources made freely available to
subsequent authors as creative infrastructure. Patent law takes the
narrowest and most rigid approach to defining intellectual infrastructure.
As such, it does not accommodate the reality that certain patented
inventions can evolve from mere applications to productivity-enhancing
infrastructure warranting liberalized access.
This Article has drawn on eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. to
argue that courts should take a functional approach to identifying and
permitting unauthorized infrastructural uses of patented inventions.428 It
proposes a two-tiered system: property rule protection for noninfrastructural uses of patented inventions and liability rule protection—
where appropriate—for patented inventions used as infrastructure. This
proposal encourages voluntary licensing negotiations between patentees
and prospective licensees, reserving liability rule protection as a judicial
backstop if such negotiations fail. Significantly, it offers a robust method
for mediating “difficult” cases of infrastructure access where neither
open access nor exclusive rights is adequate. Situating this analysis in
the context of an infringement action, rather than relying on the PTO’s
determinations of patentable subject matter upon patent issuance, allows
courts to consider an invention’s social history in determining whether it
should be eligible for liability rule protection. Additionally, this casespecific analysis allows courts to craft contextually nuanced, targeted
remedies. While this approach has general application to patented
infrastructure, it has particular salience to foundational patented
inventions in biotechnology and information technology.
Comparing analogous doctrines in trademark, copyright, and patent
law reveals the shared principle of intellectual infrastructure as a natural
limitation on exclusive rights. Analogy to the realm of inherently public
property and physical infrastructure further reveals that infrastructure is
socially defined and subject to evolution, a dynamic that patent law
currently does not accommodate. While firms, authors, and inventors
benefit society greatly through their innovations, creating value is a
reciprocal process. Society itself, through widespread adoption, use, and
reliance, helps make infrastructural creations valuable. A graduated
approach that provides compensation to upstream creators and qualified

428. Articulating a similar theme, the Supreme Court recently replaced the Federal Circuit’s
“formalistic” approach to determining nonobviousness with an “expansive and flexible approach.”
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007).
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access to downstream users balances the interests of both groups,429 and
represents a valuable step towards effectuating the overarching goals of
the intellectual property system.

429. Cf. Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 25, at 663 (arguing that property is best
understood as mediating social relations).
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